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 Abbreviations 
1. Greek sources 
 
Ar. Aristophanes  
Ach. Acharnenses (Acharnians) 
Av. Aves (Birds) 
Eq. Equites (Knights) 
Nu. Nubes (Clouds) 
Pax  (Peace) 
Ra. Ranae (Frogs) 
V. Vespae (Wasps) 
Aeschin. Aeschinus  
Pl.  Plato  
Cri. Crito  
Theaet. Theaetetus  
Hdt. Herodotus’ Historiai 
2. Glosses 
1/2/3  1st/2nd/3rd person  PRT particle 
ACC accusative PST past 
AOR aorist PTC participle 
DAT dative SBJ subjunctive 
FUT future SG/PL singular/plural 
GEN genitive   
IMPER imperative   
IMPF imperfect   
IND indicative   
INF infinitive   
MH μή   
OPT optative   
PASS passive   
PERF perfect   
PRS present   
 
 1  |  Introduction 
1. Two negation particles? The problem 
It is generally known that Ancient Greek has two words for negation: οὐ and μή 
(Kühner & Gerth 1904; Rijksbaron 2006). Their distribution is almost complementary. I 
give a quick sketch to illustrate the problem; the distribution is described in more detail 
in chapter 2. Οὐ is used in assertions with indicatives (ex. (1)) and optatives with 
particle ἄν, μή with imperative (2), subjunctive (3) and desiderative optative (4).  
 
(1) οὐ γάρ με νῦν γε διαβαλεῖ Κλέων ὅτι ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν  
not PRT me now PRT blame.FUT.IND Cleon that foreigners present the city  
κακῶς λέγω. (Ar. Ach. 502) 
badly speak.PRS.IND 
‘Cleon shall not be able to accuse me of speaking badly of the city in front of 
strangers’  
(2) ὦγαθοί, τὸ πρᾶγμ’ ἀκούσατ’, ἀλλὰ μὴ κεκράγετε. (Ar. V. 415) 
best.VOC the reality listen.IMPER but MH bawl.IMPER 
‘Friends, listen to the truth, and stop bawling.’ 
(3) μή νυν ἀνῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπεντείνωμεν ἀνδρικώτερον. (Ar. Pax 515) 
MH now give.up.1PL.SBJ but get.stronger.1PL.AOR.SBJ manly.COMP 
‘Don't let us give up, let us redouble our efforts.’ 
(4) ἀλλ’, ὦ Διόνυσ’, ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ ’λθοι φέρων. (Ar. Pax 267) 
PRT O Dionysus die.3SG.OPT.AOR and MH come.3SG.OPT.AOR bring.PTC 
‘Ah! Bacchus! May he die and not return bringing [a pestle]!’ 
 
There are, however, some problems with calling μή an “adverb of negation” (Kühner & 
Gerth, ibid.). A well-known feature of negation is that it turns questions into rhetorical 
questions: the polarity is changed (Israel (2011); Bechmann (2007); Slot (1993)). Greek 
polar questions with οὐ have the same effect: they make a statement that something is 
the case, instead of asking whether something is not the case. Questions containing 
why not? are requests: they invite or urge someone to act, instead of enquiring why 
something is not the case. The speaker expects the addressee to affirm the statement 
(not negated) or act. Questions with μή work in the opposite direction. The question 
does not cancel the negation, but rather steers the addressee in the direction of a 
negative answer. Questions with μή can be interpreted as negative requests or 
prohibitives (ex. (5)). The state of affairs is, in the eyes of the speaker, undesirable, 
something he does not want to happen. 
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(5) ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθῇ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων (…); (Pl. Cri. 44e) 
PRT PRT MH me.GEN take.care.of.2SG.SUBJ and the other friends 
‘You are not considering me and your other friends, are you, (…)?’ 
 
Another construction in which μή does not behave as a typical negation is in 
complements after verbs of fear (ex. (6)). In a complement of fear, μή does not mean 
‘not’, but is translated with ‘that’. The speaker in (6) is not afraid that the old man does 
not need beatings, but he is afraid that the old man needs them. If he was afraid 
something would not happen, the combination μή οὐ would have been used. The same 
applies to verbs of interdiction. 
 
(6) δέδοικά σ’, ὦ πρεσβῦτα, μὴ πληγῶν δέει. (Ar. Nu. 493) 
fear.1SG you O old.man MH beatings need 
‘I fear, old man, that you will need blows.’ 
 
The combination μή οὐ is thus used in complements of fear when the subject is afraid 
something will not happen. The combination οὐ μή is possible as well and is used in 
main clauses with indicative and subjunctive (ex. (7)). The two negative words do not 
cancel the negative value, but rather enhance it. 
 
(7) οὗτος μὲν οὐ μή σοι ποιήσῃ ζημίαν. (Ar. Pax 1226) 
that PRT not MH you.DAT make.3SG.AOR.SBJ harm 
‘Oh, you will lose nothing over it.’ 
 
From the few examples above, it might appear that μή cannot be used as a negation. 
However, in conditional constructions μή is clearly negation (ex. (8)) and when used in 
an oath with indicative, μή strongly means ‘not’ (ex. (9)). 
 
(8) εἰ μή μ’ ἀναπείσετ’, ἀποθανεῖσθε τήμερον  (Ar. Eq. 68) 
if MH me obey.2PL die.2PL.FUT today 
‘If you do not obey me, you will die today’ 
(9) (A: Look! Between Earth and the gods is air, right? Well, look, if we from Athens 
have to go, say to the Oracle at Delphi, we have to ask permission from the 
Boetians, to let us pass through their country. It’ll be the same with you. If 
you’ve got your city up there, the gods would have to pay you for the aromas of 
the sacrifices the humans make, to reach them.) 
B: μὴ ’γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω (Ar. Av. 195) 
MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever 
‘[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived’  
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We can expand this list with different uses of μή in relative clauses (where οὐ is used in 
non-restricting or digressive clauses, and μή in restricting clauses). For reasons of space 
I have not included relative clauses in this study, so for more details I refer to 
Rijksbaron (2006: 87ff.). 
 
In the previous examples, it was shown how the meaning of μή varies from a non-
negative meaning in complements of fear to negation in conditionals, and from hope in 
questions to certainty in oaths. Is it possible to give an account for the polysemous 
meaning of μή? That is the main research question of this thesis. 
2. Negation: objective, subjective, intersubjective 
Has this question, which is about a language that was spoken over 2000 years ago, 
never been asked and answered before? Yes, it has. An overview of approaches is 
given in chapter 2. The standard description of the difference between οὐ and μή is 
given by Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178, § 510.1): 
 
§ 510. Die Modaladverbien der Negation οὐ und μή 
1. Οὐ (…) negiert objektiv, μή subjektiv, d.h. οὐ wird gebraucht, wenn etwas 
schlechtweg negiert, d.h. als an und für sich nicht seiend bezeichnet wird; μή 
hingegen, wenn etwas von dem subjektiven Standpunkte des Redenden aus negiert, 
d.h. als nur in dem Willen oder in der Vorstellung des Redenden nicht seiend 
bezeichnet wird. Durch οὐ wird das äußere, objektive Sein aufgehoben; durch μή 
hingegen wird ein Akt der Vorstellung oder des Willens des Redenden ausgedrückt. 
(Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178, § 510.1))
1
 
 
In this grammar from over a century ago, the difference between οὐ and μή is defined 
by the difference between “objective” and “subjective”. The main function of language 
was considered describing the world and this distinction played a major part: a 
situation is true or false, and it exists in reality or in the mind. Nearly a century later, 
the view on language and communication has changed, as seen in the argumentative 
approach (Ducrot (1996), Anscombre & Ducrot (1989)) and the intersubjective 
approach (Verhagen (2005)). According to these views, the primary function of 
language is not describing the world, but it is merely used by speakers to coordinate 
cognitively with their addressees in order to create a common ground (Verhagen 
2005). The stance towards a situation (state of affairs, object of conceptualization) is 
shared, in order to lead the addressee to the right conclusions (Ducrot 1996), to 
behave in a certain way.  The main function of communication is to influence the 
                                                             
1
   Most of the citations of Kühner & Gerth come from Teil 2, Band 2 of their grammar. If a different 
part is cited, the source is given explicitly. 
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cognition and (thereby) behavior of the addressee. Utterances are never objective but 
always subjective, or rather intersubjective. I will give a more elaborate description of 
these approaches in chapter 3. 
Seen from this point of view, defining the difference between words by the 
predicate ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ seems insufficient. Negation is one of the 
phenomena in language that Verhagen (ibid.: chapter 2) has used to describe the 
intersubjectivity of language. The argumentative approach argues that a speaker only 
gives arguments in utterances, from which the addressee can draw conclusions 
himself. In this way, most words do not objectively describe the world, but merely the 
stance of a speaker, and they point towards a conclusion. Negation invalidates the 
conclusions that may ordinarily be drawn from a statement and orients the speaker 
towards other (ibid.: 42). Negation primarily has the function to help the speaker draw 
the right conclusions. I will come back to this view on negation in chapter 3 and 4.  
3. This thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to find the common characteristics in the different 
constructions with μή from an intersubjective point of view, which might bring us to a 
unifying account, allowing for the observed polysemy.  
Polysemy is strongly connected to (or caused by) diachronic language 
development. I take the idea of Kvičala (cited in Kühner & Gerth (1904: 179)) as my 
starting point. He argues that  “μή (…) had, when we take the oldest usages into 
account, not at all the meaning of negation in the beginning, but was only a rejecting, 
repelling particle (…).” This idea needs to be connected to the other values of μή that 
were shown in section 1. 
 This study will be a synchronic study. The different constructions are taken from 
comedies of Aristophanes (approx. 446–386 BCE). Details about the corpus are given in 
chapter 4. Because the size of an MA thesis is restricted, I will look at the following 
constructions with μή: complement constructions, main clauses (imperative, 
subjunctive, optative and indicative) with μή, main clauses (future indicative and 
subjunctive) with οὐ μή, and conditional clauses. Satellite clauses, relative clauses, 
participle clauses, and noun phrases are excluded from this study.  
This study is a semasiological study. This means that I will only look at the 
differences and similarities between constructions with μή. Comparing the different 
senses with the senses of οὐ would give a very interesting onomasiological study, but I 
leave that for the future. 
 
Studying language in general and classical languages in particular entails standing in a 
long tradition and being one of many. In chapter 2, I describe earlier accounts of μή 
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(and partial counterparts in other languages, such as ne in French) with very different 
approaches.  
The aim of the thesis is to look at μή with an intersubjective approach. The 
framework in which I will work is described in chapter 3. It provides a background for 
the analysis presented in chapter 4. In this chapter, I describe and compare the 
different constructions with μή in order to find a way to bring the different uses of the 
word together in one account. A summary and conclusion is given in chapter 5, as well 
as suggestions for further research.  
  
 2  |  Theoretical background: state of affairs 
1. Introduction 
From the perspective of a European scholar with a firm background in logics (which, in 
this tradition, most of us are), three things are odd about Greek negation. Firstly, Greek 
uses two different morphemes, οὐ and μή. Secondly, μή is used as negation in many 
constructions, but does not seem to negate the predicate when used in complement 
clauses after negative verbs and verbs of fear. And thirdly, when οὐ and μή are used 
together in the same clause, the clause often remains negative instead of logically 
becoming positive.  
In this chapter, several theories and accounts are discussed that try to explain 
these three ‘problems’ above.  
2. Using two different negative morphemes 
A brief sketch of the distribution of οὐ and μή was given in chapter 1. A more elaborate 
overview of the distribution and the meaning of the construction is shown in Table 1, 
after Mirambel (1946). The description is based on the verbal moods, as is the custom.  
 
Table 1. Overview of uses of οὐ and μή, divided by verbal mood (after Mirambel 1946: 58-59). 
Verbal mood οὐ μή 
Indicative Realis mode, in a declarative 
proposition, expressing an 
expected judgment conform 
reality 
[- Passionate oath] 
- Irrealis mode, in a proposition introduced with εἰ γάρ, 
ὡς, with past times or with ὤφελον (followed by 
infinitive) 
Subjunctive (not in Attic) Mode of desire, exhortation, doubt, prohibition 
[Conditional clauses] 
Optative Potential mode, with ἄν, in a main 
clause (assertion, statement of 
obligation, ability)
1
 
Mode of wish, without ἄν, in a main clause, generally 
introduced with εἰ γάρ or εἴθε 
Imperative  Prohibition 
Infinitive Complement of a declarative verb 
(say, believe, think) 
Other uses (infinitive as a subject, expressing a wish 
after a verb of wanting, infinitive expressing a goal or a 
consequence, infinitive with an article) 
Participle 
[relative clause] 
Expression of a particular 
circumstance, determined 
Expression of a general fact, undetermined 
Questions Affirming answer expected 
(rhetorical question) 
Negative answer expected 
 
 
                                                             
1
 Addition between brackets from Willmott (2008: fig. 2). 
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Summarizing: οὐ is used in indicative clauses and in embedded infinitive clauses 
expressing an assertion or a belief, μή is used in other clauses. Their distribution seems 
to depend on the interaction of various syntactic, semantic and maybe pragmatic 
parameters.  
Different scholars have tried to pin down the parameters for this distribution. One 
of the earliest is the Hellenistic grammarian Dionysios Thrax (ca. 170-90 BCE), in his Art 
of Grammar (Τέχνη γραμματική) (section ιθ’). He described οὐ as an adverb of ἄρνησις 
ἢ ἀπόφασις ‘denial or negation’ and μή as an adverb of ἀπαγόρευσις ‘prohibition’. 
However, Table 1 above shows that μή is often used in sentences that are certainly not 
prohibitive, but e.g. a desire. Two millennia later, this division of labor has been 
described in different terms, but along the same lines: objective and subjective, 
denying and repelling (Kühner & Gerth 1904; Chatzopoulou 2012), assertive and 
nonassertive, independent and dependent (Horn 1989). Horn (p. 448) calls them 
“indicative vs. directive (or assertive vs. prohibitive) axes”.  
In this section, I shortly describe three accounts that try to define the difference 
between οὐ and μή: by Kühner & Gerth (1904), by Philippaki-Warburton & 
Spyropoulos (2004), and by Willmott (2008). 
2.1 Kühner & Gerth (1904): Objective vs. subjective 
Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178)2 say about the difference between οὐ and μή (my 
translation): “Oὐ (…) negates objectively, μή subjectively, i.e. οὐ is used when 
something roughly negates, i.e. if in and of itself not being is meant; μή on the other 
hand, when something from the subjective point of view of the speaker negates, i.e. if 
only in the will or in the idea of the speaker not-being is meant. By οὐ is the outer, 
objective being canceled; by μή on the other hand an act of the imagination or of the 
will of the speaker is expressed.”3 
In a footnote, they (p. 179) cite Kvičala (1856): “οὐ is that particle, that actually 
and originally encloses the notion of cancellation, negation; μή however had, when we 
take the oldest usages into account, not at all the meaning of negation in the 
                                                             
2
 Most of the citations of Kühner & Gerth come from Teil 2, Band 2 of their grammar. If a 
different part is cited, the source is given explicitly. 
3
 Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178): “Oὐ negiert objectiv, μή subjektiv, d. h. οὐ wird gebraucht, 
wenn etwas schlechtweg negiert, d. h. als an und für sich nicht seiend bezeichnet wird; μή 
hingegen, wenn etwas von dem subjektiven Standpunkte des Redenden aus negiert, d. h. 
als nur in dem Willen oder in der Vorstellung des Redenden nicht seiend bezeichnet wird. 
Durch οὐ wird das äußere, objektive Sein aufgehoben; durch μή hingegen wird ein Akt der 
Vorstellung oder des Willens des Redenden ausgedrückt.“ 
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beginning, but was only a rejecting, repelling particle: οὐ rests on the intellectual 
activity of denying, μή on the will-activity of repelling.”4 
Important to note here is the fact that Kühner & Gerth consider negation by οὐ 
equal to yes-no (polar) questions, or in their words (p. 211): “a positive expression, that 
by preposed οὐ (…) or by the question form is negated, (…).” That means that also 
Kühner & Gerth recognize that polarity can be changed by negation and equally by 
polar questions. Mή is not equated to questions in this way. 
Negation of the infinitive 
In Table 1 it is shown that both οὐ and μή are used with the infinitive. Kühner & Gerth 
(p. 193) explain the use of both negations with the infinitive as follows.  
The infinitive “as the object of the governing verb” can have one of two meanings. 
When the main verb means meinen ‘to mean, believe, think’, to say, assert (and often 
an Accusative with Infinitive (AcI) construction is used), then the object is expressed as 
independent from the subject of the matrix verb, as an assertion from the writer. The 
infinitive is then negated with οὐ.  
With main verbs of volition, possibility, ability, necessity and “in general with 
those, of which the object can be interpreted as imagined by the subject of the main 
verb”, the object is expressed as dependent on the subject of the matrix verb, as an 
idea of the subject and negated with μή. The main verb has a ‘positive’ meaning, as 
opposed to negative verbs, e.g. deny. The use of μή with infinitive after negative main 
verbs is described in section 3. 
The infinitive with an article is always negated by μή, even when it is used to 
describe “wirklichen Thatsachen”, in which it is interpreted everywhere as an abstract 
notion (p. 197). 
Negation of the participle and adjective 
The difference between οὐ and μή is also visible when used with participles and 
adjectives (p. 198). Although these constructions are not discussed in the analysis in 
chapter 4, I mention them here to give the reader an idea of the difference between 
both negations. When the participle can be dissolved into a declarative sentence, it is 
negated with οὐ (cf. the infinitive). When the participle can be dissolved into a 
subordinate clause that would require μή, it is negated with μή. Thus οὐ πιστεύων 
                                                             
4
 Kvičala (1856) in Kühner & Gerth (1904: 179): “Oὐ ist diejenige Partikel, die eigentlich und 
ursprünglich den Begriff des Aufhebens, Verneinens in sich schließt; μή hingegen hatte, 
wenn wir die ältesten Gebrauchsweisen desselben ins Auge fassen, anfangs gar nicht die 
Geltung einer Negation, sondern war nur eine ablehnende, abwehrende Partikel: οὐ beruht 
auf der Verstandesthätigkeit des Leugnens, μή auf der Willensthätigket der Abwehr.“ 
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(PTC.PRS NOM.M.SG ‘believing’) means ‘while, because, although he does not believe’, 
versus μή πιστεύων ‘if he does not believe’.  
The participle with article, e.g. οἱ βουλόμενοι (ART PTC.PRS NOM.M.PL ‘the willing 
[people]’) can be negated with both οὐ and μή (p. 201). It is a short version of the 
relative clause. The construction is negated with οὐ, when it is related to determined 
objects or real existing facts: a non-restrictive, digressive relative clause. Μή is used 
when it expresses a purely abstract notion, but also when it relates, very general, 
without consideration to particular previous cases, to a group of persons or objects. 
Adjectives with an article are negated and interpreted in the same way. 
Concluding 
We may conclude that the notions of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ in the definition of 
Kühner & Gerth comprise many different uses. ‘Subjective’ comprises prohibitive, ‘the 
idea of the subject’, an abstract notion, a general group of entities. ‘Objective’ 
comprises assertions of the writer, independent of the subject, and determined 
existing entities. 
This contrast of ‘objective—subjective’ may describe the distinction, but it is not 
very specific. When is an utterance objective or subjective? Is an oath about the past (‘I 
swear I have never’) subjective? And an utterance with an epistemic stance (expressing 
the probability that something is the case) with an optative with ἄν objective? I think 
we overlook the different senses of μή when we just name it ‘subjective’. Willmott 
(2008) (section 2.3) raises the same objections to the account of Philippaki-Warburton 
& Spyropoulos (2004). 
2.2 Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004): Epistemic vs. deontic 
The view of Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004), one century later, does not 
deviate much from Kühner & Gerth, although they use different terms. They state that 
the choice of negative morpheme in the main clause is not associated with the mood 
of the verb, because many verbal moods can occur with both negations (visible in 
Table 1 above). “As it is evident from the situation in embedded clauses, negation is 
affected by the modality of the clause. Thus, μή is the negation for deontic and οὐ for 
epistemic modality” (ibid.: 794). They base their conclusion on the assumption that 
subjunctive, optative and imperative verbs “prototypically” express deontic modalities 
and are prototypically negated with μή, as opposed to indicative, which is used in 
epistemic modalities.  
In a footnote, Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (p. 811, n. 10) add that this 
split between modalities is also visible in conjunctions (“complementizers”). Some 
conjunctions, e.g. ὅτι, are incompatible with the subjunctive mood, and others, e.g. 
ἵνα, incompatible with the indicative. “This incompatibility may be attributed to the 
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modality associated with these complementizers, that is, epistemic with ὅτι vs. deontic 
with ἵνα.” 
 
It is not made clear in this article what is to be understood by ‘deontic’ modality. Many 
definitions are given in the literature (cf. Nuyts 2006). A problem for this proposal is 
that e.g. the conditional construction is not discussed. Is the antecedent (condition, 
protasis) of a conditional to be considered ‘deontic’? Willmott (2008) points out that 
the categorization is too simple. 
2.3 Willmott (2008): Different categories 
Willmott (2008) argues against the conclusion of Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos 
(2004). She lists the uses of the negators in Homeric Greek and links them to the 
functional categories proposed by Cinque (2004); her two tables are combined in Table 
2 below. She concludes that the two different negators are found in a range of 
different contexts, “which may not be simply categorized as deontic/epistemic or 
±modal”. She claims that the negators can each operate at different ‘levels’ of the 
clause. I will not go into the (generative cartographic) details here, but the proposal of 
Willmott shows that the binary objective/subjective or epistemic/deontic view may not 
be sufficient. 
 
Table 2. The uses of the negators in Homeric Greek  
Mood Construction Negator Functional 
category 
Imperative/subjunctive Directives μή Speech act 
Optative Wishes μή Speech act 
Optative/subjunctive/indicative Conditional antecedents μή Irrealis 
Optative/subjunctive/indicative Purpose clauses μή Irrealis 
Optative/indicative Conditional consequents οὐ Irrealis 
Optative Statements of obligation οὐ Obligation 
Optative Statements of ability οὐ Permission/ 
Ability 
Indicative/subjunctive Assertions  οὐ  
 
2.4 (Non-)standard negation 
Ancient Greek is one of many languages that use different words (or affixes) to negate 
different constructions. Can we compare the difference between οὐ and μή with the 
use of negation in other languages?  
The description of οὐ and μή above suggests that οὐ is what is called in the 
literature “standard negation”, and μή “non-standard negation”. Typological studies 
usually concentrate on what has been seen as the basic negation constructions in 
languages (Dahl 2010), such as “negation in simple indicative sentences with a verbal 
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predicate” (Dahl 1979, cited in Dahl 2010). Also Dryer (2013) shows only “clausal 
negation in declarative sentences”. This tendency can be traced back to Aristotle, who 
explicitly excluded nondeclaratives from his treatise De Interpretatione because they 
were the subject of rhetoric, instead of logic (Horn 1989: 86 n. 68; Whitaker 2002: 72).  
The focus on standard negation has the consequence that there are no systematic 
typological surveys on “non-standard negation”, of which μή is an example (Dahl 
2010).5 The one systematic typological study (that I know of) in which Modern Greek 
μή is mentioned, is about prohibitives (Van der Auwera et al. 2013). This map shows 
that only one third (34%) of the languages in the sample uses “standard negation” to 
express a prohibitive. The majority uses “non-standard” strategies like Ancient Greek. 
The use of a distinct negative marker is extremely widespread in the world outside of 
Europe, and the same is true for a distinct negative marker for “the semantically 
related irrealis and potential” (Croft 1991: 14). 
The fact that μή is considered “non-standard” must be the reason that literature 
on the use of this word (or counterparts in other languages) is not easy to find. Are 
there more languages that use different negative morphemes in these constructions? 
Do they follow the same syntactic, semantic or pragmatic parameters? It is known that 
Latin has two negative morphemes, non and ne, and they are used (almost) along the 
same lines as Ancient Greek6, as is the case for Sanskrit and the ancient Anatolian 
languages (Horn 1989: 448). But I have not found any literature that describes the 
same phenomenon in modern languages. Van der Auwera et al. (2013) show some 
languages in and close to Europe that use a distinct negative marker for the prohibitive 
(e.g. Hebrew, Armenian, Welsh, Hungarian), but this prohibitive marker does not seem 
to be used like in Ancient Greek: e.g. in complement clauses after negative main verbs, 
in combination with the standard negation, or in conditional clauses. 
In short: because of the traditional focus on assertions, research on non-standard 
negation like μή is rare, compared to research on standard negation. The few 
(Eurocentric) accounts that I have found are given in section 3 and 4 below. 
3. Μή in complements after negative main verbs 
Horn (2010: 112) uses the term “hypernegation” for two negations in a sentence with 
negative meaning. Hypernegation occurs (apart from negative concord) in cases of 
                                                             
5
 Dahl (2010: 34): “There has so far been relatively little attention paid to the principles by 
which languages with more than one negative construction choose between them. In fact, 
there is a wealth of potential topics for research papers or even doctoral theses relating to 
the typology of negation, (…), the interaction with modality, etc.” 
6
 Non corresponds with οὐ, ne with μή. Latin does not have the nuance of different 
meanings like Greek using οὐ or μή with participle and relative clause with resp. specific or 
generic meaning. 
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“pleonastic negation”, also called “sympathetic”, “paratactic”, “expletive” or “abusive 
negation” (Horn 2010: 121). Jespersen (1917: 75) describes this type of negation as 
follows: “a negative is placed in a clause dependent on a verb of negative import like 
‘deny, forbid, hinder, doubt’.” This type of negation is found in Greek (μή), Latin, 
French, Catalan, Sanskrit, Old English, some German dialects. In some of these 
languages, it is also found in a clause dependent on a verb of ‘fear’ as well. 
 
In this section, I describe four theories that explain why two negatives do not result in 
an affirmative, instead of what we would expect based on logic. Paratactic negation: 
the two negatives are not in the same clause (3.1); expletive negation: one of the two 
negatives is semantically empty (3.2); one of the two negatives is actually not a 
negative but a possibility marker (3.3); and the two negations are not functioning at 
the same semantic or pragmatic level (negation versus resistance, 3.4).  
3.1 Paratactic negation 
Jespersen (1917: 75) explains negatives in a complement of a verb like deny, forbid, 
hinder, doubt as paratactic negation. The complement is “treated as an independent 
sentence, and the negative is expressed as if there had been no main sentence of that 
particular kind.” When two negatives are not in the same clause, they cannot form an 
affirmative together.  
Jespersen continues by saying that this develops easily in languages in which the 
employed negative has no longer its full negative value, such as French (ne)7 and Latin 
(ne, quin), but is also used in other languages (“by no means rare”), such as English, 
German, Danish. English examples are: we have forbidden that they doe not shew any 
naturall worke (Bacon); I warned him not to do it. 
Joly (1972: 33) notes that this hypothesis of parataxis is untenable for French. 
When the complement is treated like an actual independent clause, ne disappears: Il 
viendra, je le crains “he will come, I fear it” (cf. Je crains que il ne vienne with equivalent 
meaning). 
Kühner & Gerth (1904) 
Kühner & Gerth’s explanation fits into this category as well, although they do not use 
the term ‘paratactic negation’. Mή is naturally not a connective particle, but the 
prohibitive particle in the corresponding independent clause (p. 391). Kühner & Gerth 
(p. 221) distinguish μή after main verbs with the meaning ‘prevent’ and ‘deny’, taking 
an infinitive as their object (ex. (1)), from μή after main verbs meaning ‘fear’, ‘concern’, 
‘uncertainty’, ‘consideration’, ‘doubt’, ‘distrust’, ‘danger’, ‘dangerous’, ‘suspect’, etc. 
                                                             
7
 Cf. section 3.2. 
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(ex. (2)). These verbs take a finite clause as their object, with subjunctive mood, 
optative mood or even indicative. 
 
(1) εἴργω σε μὴ ἐλθεῖν  (from Kühner & Gerth, p. 207) 
prevent.1sg you.acc MH come.inf 
‘I prevent that you come’ 
(2) δείδω μή τι πάθῃσιν  (from Kühner & Gerth, p. 391) 
fear.1sg MH something undergo.3sg 
‘I fear that something happens to him’ 
 
Kühner & Gerth argue that the main verb with the meaning of ‘preventing’ or ‘denying’ 
(ex. (1)) is weakened to the notions of ‘saying’ and ‘willing’, and the infinitive is more 
independent. The implicit negation in the main verb is explicitly added to the infinitive. 
Thus we see μή in complements with infinitive, but also οὐ in a finite complement 
clause with conjunctions ὅτι and ὡς. Rarely clauses without a negation are found after 
verbs of preventing or denying. 
In ‘concern clauses’ (ex. (2)), the subjunctive μή expresses the concern that 
something takes place. The main verb of fear may be omitted. The concern clause 
bears no formal signs of subordination [unlike the infinitive clause, DJ] (Kühner & 
Gerth, p. 391). As said above, μή is naturally not a connective particle, but the 
prohibitive particle in the corresponding independent clause. Formally, we are dealing 
with parataxis. According to Kühner & Gerth, an expression like ex. (2) might be 
interpreted as ‘I am in fear: may nothing happen to him!’, but the close [semantic] 
connection of the both sentences led to the idea that the second clause was 
dependent on the first and the connection was made by μή in the sense of ‘that’: ‘I am 
afraid that something happens to him!’.8 The latter interpretation fits well into the 
category of ‘abusive/expletive negation’.  
Important to note in this context is that μή often loses its meaning of ‘not-willing’ 
(Kühner & Gerth, volume 2, part 1, p. 224). The notion of concern “fades into the 
background” and μή becomes merely a particle that expresses a probability (my 
wording). It is not clear from Kühner & Gerth’s description whether the negative 
evaluation is still part of the meaning. This interpretation would fit well into the theory 
described in 3.3 (marking a possibility) and 4.1 of this chapter. This tendency, that a 
word meaning ‘concern’ is also used for an epistemic stance, is seen in Dutch (Nuyts 
2007) and English as well: I am afraid so ‘that is very well possible (but not sure)’. 
 
                                                             
8
 Asyndeton, i.e. lack of conjunctions, is very rare in Greek. Usually, even two main clauses 
are connected by one or more connecting particles.  
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This view on complementation, that the main verb is “weakened” and the complement 
more “independent”, comes close to that of the intersubjective approach and to what I 
will argue in my analysis in chapter 4. In this approach, the complement is seen as the 
most informative part of the utterance, while the matrix verb only informs the 
addressee about how to interpret the content of the complement and what he should 
do with it (my wording). In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I come back to complement 
clauses in this approach. 
3.2 Abusive (expletive) negation 
The account of abusive negation originates from French linguistics. French “expletive” 
ne can be used three constructions:9 in complement clauses of verbs that express fear, 
doubt, prevention or precaution; after conjunctions like avant que ‘before’ (e.g. je suis 
parti avant qu’il ne soit arrivé ‘I left before he arrived’); and in the second part of the 
comparative construction que ne ‘than’. Because complement clauses with ne are 
similar to those with Greek μή, it may be useful to look at this account. 
Vendryès (1950): the faded negative value of ne  
Vendryès (1950: 1) calls these uses of French ne “abusive negation”, because it is 
“applicable to a notion that is already more or less implied in the idea that is 
expressed, and of which the expression is extended stealthily outside its domain 
overlapping with the neighboring domain”.10  
Ne in complement clauses of verbs that express fear, doubt, prevention or 
precaution is used in the same way as Greek μή. To express that one is afraid that 
something happens, ne is used in the complement clause; e.g. je crains qu’il ne vienne ‘I 
am afraid he will come’ and cela n’empêche pas qu’il ne soit fort malade ‘That does not 
prevent that he is very ill’. On the other hand, to express that one is afraid that 
something will not happen, ne…pas is used; e.g. je crains qu’il ne vienne pas ‘I am afraid 
he will not come’. In Greek, the complement clause contains μή οὐ, to express the fear 
of something not happening (see section 4.1). In such complement clauses, according 
to Vendryès (p. 15), the value of ne is really implied by the idea expressed by the verb.  
Vendryès (p. 8) explains this as follows: “The negative value of ne has passed to 
the elements pas or point and has faded onto them (…), so that ne alone could be 
inserted improperly in a sentence that is not really negative and where the negation 
only floats in the idea to express.” In my words, ne is semantically bleached, or at least 
                                                             
9 
As opposed to “forclusif” ne, which is followed by pas. See e.g. Vendryès (1950) for details. 
10
 « (…) le mot « abusif » s’applique à une notion plus ou moins impliquée dans l’idée à 
exprimer, et dont l’expression s’étend furtivement hors de son domaine en empiétant sur 
le voisin. » 
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has not enough power to negate a sentence anymore. The negating power is now only 
found in pas, point, aucun and personne.  
However, negation in a complement clause is also found in other languages, 
where the negative morpheme is not semantically bleached, such as Greek, Old 
English, German (Middle Ages to eighteenth century). About these cases Vendryès 
(p.15) concludes that “we may say that the use of negation is a sign of a more free 
syntax, and it is natural that purists forbid it in the name of logic.” For these other 
languages, he tends towards a more paratactic analysis (cf. section 3.1).  
Müller (1978): ne is dependent on negation in main verb 
Müller’s (1978) hypothesis is close to that of Vendryès. He uses the term “expletive 
negation”, because it “does nothing to the meaning of the sentence” (p. 76). One 
fundamental property of ne is that no negative/affirmative opposition appears 
between P and ne P (p.96).  
He observes that complements with ne carry negative polarity, e.g. empêcher que 
ne P, eviter que ne P  ‘prevent that P happens’ “make sure P does not happen”. 
Apparently, for French ne to appear in the complement clause, there must be a 
negative element in the main clause. He suggests (p. 96) that “ne is to be attached to 
the main clause, specifically to a negative term in the main clause”. Ne becomes 
dependent on a negation in the main clause. Since the complement clause, due to the 
meaning of empêcher ‘prevent’, is always negative, ne is understood as inherent to the 
verb empêcher. The negation is semantically shifted from the subordinate clause to the 
main clause. To explain the complements of verbs of fear (craindre que ne P ‘to fear P’), 
which main clauses have a positive polarity and thus not a negative term for ne to be 
dependent on, Müller rephrases craindre into se demander si ne pas P ‘to wonder if 
not P’ and juger non impossible que ‘to deem not impossible that’, so that ne is 
dependent on a construction with double affective polarity (question-negation and 
double negation).  
Review 
Both Vendryès and Müller (partly) explain the negative meaning of a sentence with two 
negations by suggesting that the negation in the subordinate clause is semantically 
empty or is merged with the main verb (my wording). Negation after a negative main 
verb in languages with a negation with full value (other than French ne) is explained by 
Vendryès by a “more free syntax”. This is what Jespersen (1917) suggests as well 
(section 3.1). 
It is interesting to see how Vendryès and Müller somehow mirror the account of 
Kühner & Gerth. Whereas the latter argue that the main clauses is semantically 
weakened compared to the complement, Vendryès and Müller argue that the value of 
An intersubjective approach to constructions with μή in Greek 25 
 
ne has faded and that the value of the main clause is stronger. The difference is 
obviously caused by the fact that μή in other environments has an inevitable negative 
value, whereas ne has not.  
Joly (1972: 33) objects the expletive account: “If (having) meaning is the condition 
sine qua non the existence of language—language is made to say the experience: we 
do not speak to not say—it is surprising how many languages have preserved and 
continue the use of signs “useless of sense” (…).” I agree in the sense that we cannot 
just give the label “expletive” to μή in complements after negative verbs and verbs of 
fear, and that we should look for a function or meaning. It is well possible that this 
function is not similar to negation. 
3.3 Marking a possibility or non-veridicality 
Kühner & Gerth (1904, volume 2, part 1, p. 224) argue that in some constructions, the 
negative value of μή fades into the background and the word becomes merely a 
marker of possibility/probability (my wording). Müller (1978) hints that French 
expletive ne might have to do with the expression of a possibility as opposed to a fact, 
rather than negative polarity in the main clause.  
Yoon (2010) shows that in Korean and Japanese also verbs with the (positive) 
meaning of hope and want take a complement with an expletive negation, rather than 
only verbs with negative semantics. This led Giannakidou & Yoon (2009) to believe that 
the negative morpheme is a marker for nonveridicality.  
Yoon (2010: 59-60) lists all the environments in which expletive negation may be 
used in a small sample of (mostly European) languages, among which is Modern Greek: 
“Fear, Hope, Exclamative, Emphatic question, Dubitative, Concessive conditional, 
Before clause, Until clause, Polite request, Comparative”. In these constructions either 
an expletive negation is used or the verb is in subjunctive mood (or neither or both). 
She proposes that expletive negation and the subjunctive mood are of a similar nature. 
The properties of expletive negation are characterized as “a certain inequality relation 
in terms of probability, certainty, desirability, directness of speech, temporality, or 
degree,” and this relation is summarized on a undesirability scale or an unlikelihood 
scale. She states that the negative element is adopted for the purpose of 
circumventing a commitment to a truthful statement. She also argues that the 
pragmatic roles of expletive negation could be softening or strengthening illocutionary 
force, “which is strongly reminiscent of what subjunctive mood does.” The crucial 
connection between expletive negation and the subjunctive is the fact that they both 
typically occur in nonveridical environments. 
‘Nonveridical’ is defined by Zwarts (1995: 287) as follows: “expressions like it 
seems that, it is possible that and Sue hopes that are all nonveridical in the sense that 
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the truth of the statements [It possible that Smith will survive; Sue hopes that Alice has 
won the prize] does not necessarily imply the truth of the propositions expressed by 
the subordinate clause.” The expressions seems and possible are examples of 
nonveridical operators, as are e.g. future tense, imperative mood, subjunctive mood, 
connectives or and if, adverb perhaps, non-factive before11, intentional verbs like hope 
or want. 
A problem is that μή is not used in some of these nonveridical constructions. 
Possibilities are sometimes expressed with optative with ἄν, negated with οὐ; idem for 
future tense and ἴσως ‘perhaps’. This category ‘nonveridical’ seems able to be objected 
with the same remarks that Willmott (2008) gave to Philippaki-Warburton & 
Spyropoulos (2004): it overlooks the different functions of all the different 
constructions that can be called ‘nonveridical’. Within the category ‘nonveridical’, μή 
seems to have different senses and uses. 
 
That there is a link between expletive/pleonastic negation and uncertainty is also 
shown by Espinal (1997; mentioned in Horn 2010: 133). In Catalan, the following 
minimal pair exist: Tinc por que arribaran tard ‘I’m afraid they will arrive late’ versus 
Tinc por que no arribin tard ‘I’m afraid they might arrive late.’ In the former the speaker 
regards the arrival as likely, while in the latter (with negation and subjunctive mood) 
the speaker is more doubtful about the occurrence of the event.12  
As said earlier, Müller observed that ne in French is impossible with a proven fact. 
The same is true for μή in Greek (Rijksbaron 2006). 
3.4 Different level: resistance or discordance 
Instead of treating the pleonastic negative element like a negation that has to do with 
the semantics of the sentence, with polarity, or with epistemic modality, some scholars 
have proposed that it is an element functioning on pragmatic level, to express 
‘resistance’ or ‘discordance’.  
Above, in section 2.1, Kvičala (1856) was cited, who connected μή to the will-
activity of repelling. This sense of resistance is also found in Van Ginneken (1907: 199-
200): “Negation in natural language is not logical negation, but the expression of the 
sentiment of resistance. (…) this is best seen in the fact that two or more negations do 
not compensate, but reinforce one another.” 
 
                                                             
11
 Non-factive before is found in Max died before he saw his grandchildren.  
12
 However, I doubt if this is really the function of no here. Does it really express uncertainty or is it 
actually a way to bring a bad message: by mitigating it? If the latter is true, no would only be used 
with undesirable situations. 
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Damouret & Pichon (1931: 131-2) argue that ne in the subordinate clause always 
expresses a “discordance” between the subordinate clause and the “central fact of the 
sentence”. With verbs of fear, there is a discordance between the desire of the subject 
of the main verb and the possibility that he considers. With verbs of precaution, there 
is a discordance between the efforts of the subject and the danger that exists despite 
of the efforts. With verbs of prevention, there is a discordance between the 
phenomenon that is expected to happen and the force that prevents it. Tesnière 
(1969: 225) follows them: “The discordant [ne] therefore marks nothing more than a 
mismatch of the mind to the content of a given proposition.” 
Joly (1972: 34-35) raises a problem: ne is nonobligatory in these constructions. It 
is strange that the ‘discordance’ is not expressed in clauses without ne.  
3.5 Summary 
Different strategies were described to explain the use of a negative element in a 
complement after a negative verb or a verb of fear, without giving the complement a 
negative meaning. The paratactic strategy treats the complement as a more 
independent clause that needs its own negative element. Kühner & Gerth argue that 
the main verb’s negative meaning is weakened. This strategy, with some adjustments, 
comes close to the intersubjective approach. The ‘expletive’ strategy treats the 
negative element as (nearly) semantically empty, or at least dependent on the main 
verb for its negative meaning. This strategy seems not applicable to Greek μή. The 
‘possibility/nonveridical’ strategy treats the negative element not as semantically 
empty, but as an element without a negative meaning. The element is a marker for a 
possibility, as opposed to a fact. A problem is that also Greek οὐ is used in these 
nonveridical environments, and that many constructions are included in one big 
category: their differences might be overlooked. Other strategies treat the negative 
element as an element that does not add something to the meaning of the sentence, 
but functions merely on the level of the mind of the speaker: it expresses resistance or 
discordance to the content of the sentence. 
From these strategies, a few elements were brought into my analysis (chapter 4): 
the expression of resistance has become the starting point, and the paratactic account, 
or rather the ‘weakened’ main verb, proves to be useful. 
4. Oὐ and μή together in one clause 
The third logician’s problem with Greek negation is that the negatives οὐ and μή can 
be used together in one clause, but in many cases, they do not annihilate each other 
like we would expect from a logical perspective.  
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The order of oὐ and μή matters: oὐ μή is not used in the same constructions as μή 
oὐ. In the following sections, the use of the two combinations in different 
constructions is described. For most constructions, Kühner & Gerth (1904), Tesnière 
(1969) and Rijksbaron (1991) have proposed an explanation. 
4.1 Mή oὐ  
The combination μή oὐ is used in three different constructions, and has a different 
meaning in either construction. Mή oὐ is used in complements with subjunctive after 
verbs of fear and in ‘concern clauses’ in which the main verb is ‘omitted’. The 
combination is also used in complements with infinitive after negated negative main 
verbs and after negated positive main verbs. Because this combination occurs only 
once in my corpus ‘without a main verb’, I discuss only this construction briefly. 
After verbs of fear (with finite verb) or ‘without a main verb’ 
Verbs of fear (or concern, doubt, distrust) take finite clauses as their complement. As 
mentioned above (section 3.1), μή is used when the object of the fear will come or has 
come. The combination μή οὐ is used when it is feared that the object of the fear will 
not come or has not come (cf. French, section 3.2).  
Frequently this μή and μή οὐ is seen without a main verb: only μή (οὐ) expresses 
the concern (Kühner & Gerth 1904: 221). These constructions express an anxiety and 
often function as cautious statements (Rijksbaron 2006). Rijksbaron (1991: 168): “The 
speaker simultaneously expresses fear and a general request that the state of affairs he 
fears shall not obtain.”  
Mή with subjunctive expresses “rather a cautious assertion” that something will 
be the case (Rijksbaron 1991). This ‘cautious assertion’ corresponds to Kühner & Gerth 
(volume 2 part 1, p. 224), when they argue that the notion of concern “fades into the 
background” and μή becomes merely a particle that is used for mitigation (my 
wording), or in their words: “als feinere Form der Behauptung”. If only one of the two 
words is a negation and the other one only expresses mitigation, the meaning is 
logically negative. See example (3) and (4). 
 
(3) μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι (Pl. Cri. 48d) 
MH not must.SBJ consider.INF 
“[I am afraid that] we must not consider” 
‘it may be that we ought not to consider’ 
(4) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ χρηστήριον (Hdt. 5, 79)  
but rather MH not that be.SBJ the oracle 
‘das wird wohl nicht der Sinn des Orakels sein‘ (translation Kühner & Gerth) 
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Tesnière (1969: 233) explains the negative meaning of μή οὐ by considering them in 
different clauses. They are “actually extremely shortened clauses”, of which the first in 
the utterance would be part of a main clause and the second part of a subordinate 
clause. They function on different levels, or (in the words of Tesnière) in different 
propositions, and are actually not part of one clause. In this way, the two negatives do 
not annihilate one another, “but each preserve their full value in the proposition.”  
Tesnière (ibid.) says about the combination of μή οὐ after verbs of fear: “the first 
negation μή applies to the object of a sentiment like e.g. fear, while the second 
negation οὐ applies to the content of the fear.” 
After negated negative main verbs (with infinitive) 
As shown in section 3.1, a negative main verb takes an infinitive complement with μή, 
e.g. denying, contradicting, doubting, distrust, prohibition, etc.. When this main verb is 
negated by oὐ or when the main clause is a question, then the dependent infinitive is 
constructed with μή oὐ “in the meaning of the German infinitive without negation” 
(p.210). 
Kühner & Gerth assume that negative main verbs are weakened to the notions of 
‘saying’ and ‘willing’, and the infinitive is more independent and therefore needs the 
negation. “Mή comes with the infinitive because the whole thought was negative” (p. 
210). About negated negative main verbs, e.g. I do not deny μὴ οὐ, they argue: “here 
μή is cancelled by the insertion of oὐ, because the whole thought is affirmative.” The 
idea that μή is cancelled by οὐ is supported by the fact that the complement may also 
appear sometimes without μή οὐ. 
After negated positive main verbs (with infinitive) 
Positive main verbs are e.g. verbs of volition, possibility, ability, necessity. The 
complement of these verbs are negated with μή. When this positive main verb is 
negated by οὐ or when the main clause is a question, then the dependent infinitive is 
constructed with μή οὐ.  
We find this construction after expressions like: it is not possible, it is not ready, it 
is not fit/proper, it is not righteous, I don’t hope, I am not sure, it is not probable, it is 
illogical… Kühner & Gerth (p. 212) describe them as “expressions, that hold a negative 
notion, in that they express something that the emotion or the morality conflicts with: 
it is immoral, I am ashamed.” Besides μή οὐ also single μή is found with this meaning. 
4.2 Oὐ μή  
The combination οὐ μή (with subjunctive aorist or with indicative future) only appears 
in sentences (main clauses) that confidently express a negative assertion about the 
future; οὐ μή is used as a strong negation (Kühner & Gerth, p. 221). When the verb is 
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in second person, the assertion is interpreted as a strong prohibition. “A quite lively, 
excited, occasionally strict and bitter tone is unmistakable” (Kühner & Gerth, p. 222).  
In (5) and (6), two examples of the combination οὐ μή are given: one with 1st 
person aorist subjunctive13 and one with second person future. 
 
(5) κοὐ μή ποτέ σου παρὰ τὰς κάννας οὐρήσω μηδ’ ἀποπάρδω. (Ar. V. 394)  
and.not MH ever your against the fence urinate.1SG.AOR.SBJ and.MH 
fart.1SG.AOR.SBJ 
“And I will surely never urinate against your fence and let me not fart” 
‘I swear I will never make water, never, nor ever let a fart, against the railing of 
thy statue.’ 
(6) ὦ μιαρώτατε, τί ποιεῖς; οὐ μὴ καταβήσει. (Ar. V. 397bis) 
PRT brutal, what do.2SG.PRS ? not MH descend.2SG.IND.FUT 
‘Ha, rascal! what are you doing there? You shall not descend.’  
Kühner & Gerth (1904) 
In the combination οὐ μή, the two negatives do not cancel each other, but rather 
reinforce each other. Kühner & Gerth (p. 221) assume that this works as follows: “μή 
originally points at a concern of the speaker, that by οὐ is put in negation.” As 
mentioned earlier in section 3.1, μή sometimes loses the notion of concern, but 
functions more like a particle expressing a possibility (my wording), giving the sentence 
“a nuance” (“feinere Form der Behauptung”).14 According to Kühner & Gerth, this 
nuance of uncertainty is negated by οὐ, which results in a strong negation. 
 
(7) οὐ μὴ γενήται (γενήσεται) τοῦτο (Kühner & Gerth, p. 221) 
not MH happen.SBJ (happen.IND.FUT) that 
“it is not (οὐ) to be feared, that (μή) this happens (will happen)” (translation 
K&G) 
‘it will certainly not happen’  
 
Rijksbaron (1991)  
Whereas Kühner & Gerth make no semantic difference between this construction with 
subjunctive and indicative future, Rijksbaron does. Rijksbaron (1991: 171) argues that 
sentences with the construction οὐ μή with future indicative should be taken as 
questions. It is the negative variant of οὐ with future indicative verbs in second person 
in questions. The question elicits a positive answer to the rejection of the state of 
affairs concerned. As in English: Won’t you stay? ‘please stay’, Greek questions with οὐ 
                                                             
13
 This gloss is debatable. It may also be 1
st
 person future indicative, which has the same form. 
However, since ἀποπάρδω is subjunctive aorist, I think οὐρήσω is as well. 
14
 Kühner & Gerth (1904), volume 2, part 1, p. 224. 
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and a verb in second person are meant as imperatives (or adhortatives). It is a variant 
of the imperative. With μή, this positive imperative (my wording) is turned into a 
prohibitive.  
Rijksbaron (ibid.) summarizes the relationship between the construction οὐ μή 
with future indicative and the imperative as in (8-11) (μένω ‘stay’):  
 
(8) μένε/μεῖνον 
IMP.PRS/IMP.AOR  
‘Stay!’ 
(9) οὐ μενεῖς;  
not IND.FUT?  
‘Will you not stay?’ 
(10) μὴ μένε/μὴ μείνῃς  
MH IMP/MH SBJ.AOR  
‘Don’t stay!’ 
(11) οὐ μὴ μενεῖς;  
not MH IND.FUT?  
“will you not not stay?” ‘Is it not the case that you will not stay?’ 
 
In fact, Rijksbaron adds an extra negation to these two by putting the assertion in an 
interrogative form (cf. section 2.1, or Kühner & Gerth p. 211). In doing this, he follows 
the logics of [ − × − × − = − ] (my wording). 
 
I think Rijksbaron’s strategy is farfetched. Turning this clause into a question in order to 
find a reason for the negative meaning is not attractive and appears artificial. More 
appealing is the explanation by Kühner & Gerth, but still the sort of meta-negation (οὐ 
negates the nuance of μή) is strange when in the construction μή οὐ, οὐ negates the 
content of the concern (expressed by μή). 
4.3 Summary 
In most cases, the combinations μή οὐ and οὐ μή have a negative meaning, instead of 
the ‘logically’ expected positive meaning.  
After verbs of fear, μή and οὐ function on different levels, according to Tesnière 
(1969) and (implicitly) according to Kühner & Gerth and Rijksbaron (1991, 2006). In this 
way, the elements do not cancel each other. Tesnière: Μή applies to the object of a 
sentiment like e.g. fear, while οὐ applies to the content of the fear. Kühner & Gerth 
and Rijksbaron (1991, 2006) argue that μή is sometimes not a negative element, but 
expresses uncertainty about a statement, in which οὐ functions as a negation.  
Main clauses with οὐ μή confidently express a negative assertion about the 
future. According to Kühner & Gerth, the uncertainty that is expressed by μή is 
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negated by οὐ. Rijksbaron argues that these assertions should be taken as questions. A 
polar question adds a negation, so that Rijksbaron ends up with three negations for a 
logical negative meaning of the sentence. I argued that both accounts are not very 
appealing. 
5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have attempted to present an overview of the standard accounts on 
expletive/pleonastic negation: negation that does not seem to follow the rules of logic.  
In section 2, I ended with the unsatisfactory conclusion that there has not been 
done much research on non-standard negation like μή yet. For this reason, the 
diversity of accounts may be somewhat limited. At the same time it is a justification for 
this thesis.  
In section 3, I have shown the different strategies to cope with a negative element 
in a complement after a negative verb or a verb of fear. There are three main 
solutions: main clause and complement are not in the same clause (paratactic), the 
main clause has lost its negative value (Kühner & Gerth), or the complement clause has 
lost its negative value (expletive negation). Related to the latter solution, the expletive 
negative element may express nonveridicality, or it is not logically negative but it 
expresses resistance. From above strategies, the weakened main verb and the element 
of resistance are taken over into my analysis. 
In section 4, I have shown the different constructions in which μή and οὐ occur 
together in one clause, and the different explanations for the negative meaning of the 
clause. For μή οὐ with subjunctive, two solutions are proposed: μή expresses no 
negation but concern, so that οὐ give a negative value to the clause (Kühner & Gerth); 
or both negations are in different clauses, with μή as a main clause and οὐ as a 
complement (Tesnière 1969). For οὐ μή with subjunctive or future indicative, Kühner & 
Gerth’s explanation comes close to that by Tesnière: οὐ negates the expression of 
concern of μή. Rijksbaron (1991) proposes that all sentences with this construction 
should be taken as questions. Although the analysis of both negations being on 
different levels is not attractive, I think treating μή as a particle that expresses concern 
is the most helpful. 
 
In chapter 3, the argumentative and intersubjective approach(es) are described as a 
preparation for chapter 4, in which I present my analysis. 
 
 3  |  Theoretical framework: intersubjectivity, 
argumentativity and desirability 
1. Introduction 
In this thesis, μή is explored from the point of view of the argumentative approach 
(Anscombre & Ducrot 1989; Ducrot 1996) and intersubjective approach (Verhagen 
2005). Recall that Kühner & Gerth (1904) μή is used to express ‘concern’, and they cite 
Kvičala, who calls μή a repelling particle. In this study, I want to explore this idea, within 
the context of the argumentative and intersubjective approach. For this purpose, the 
notion of desirability and evaluative stance is added to the approaches above, as 
described by Akatsuka (1997, 1999), Daalder (2006, 2009), Ducrot (1996), Verhagen 
(1995). 
The goal of this chapter is to establish a (back)ground for the next chapter, in 
which the hypothesis is treated.  
2. An intersubjective and argumentative framework for desirability 
The background is sketched in 7 steps: 
I. An utterance is made to influence cognition/behavior of addressee. 
II. An utterance is an argument for some conclusion. 
III. The bridge between argument and conclusion is a topos. 
IV. The construal configuration and the function of complementation 
V. Epistemic and evaluative stances towards an object of conceptualization. 
VI. Evaluative stance: Desirability as a descriptive concept 
VII. Three motives for human communication 
I  An utterance is made to influence cognition/behavior of addressee. 
The intersubjective approach is based on the following principle: “Communication 
reelects the fundamental processes of regulation and assessing the behavior of others, 
not of exchanging information.” (Owings & Morton 1998: i, cited in Verhagen 2005: 8). 
People communicate, utter sentences, to influence the cognition or behavior of the 
other by influencing the attitude of the hearer towards an object of conceptualization. 
Every utterance is an invitation from the speaker to the addressee to entertain a 
certain stance towards an object of conceptualization. 
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II  An utterance is an argument for some conclusion. 
Expressions provide an argument for some conclusion; that is their default condition. 
They are oriented towards a conclusion (an attitude towards a state of affairs), and in 
this way they have an argumentative direction or orientation (Verhagen 2005: 10).  
Consider the example (after Ducrot (1996)):  
 
(1) A: Would you like to go out for a walk?  
B: Eh, it is raining outside.  
 
The answer of B to A’s question is an argument to the conclusion “No, I do not want to 
go out for a walk”.  
Verhagen (2005: 22): “Linguistic expressions are primarily cues for making 
inferences, and understanding does not primarily consist in decoding the precise 
content of the expressions, but in making inferences that lead to adequate next 
(cognitive, conversational, behavioral) moves.” This conclusion may be a certain belief 
or attitude (‘cognitive move’) or the choice to act in a certain way (‘behavioral move’). 
Or, in my words: the task for the addressee is not finding out ‘What does this utterance 
mean?’ but ‘What does the speaker mean by this? Why does he say this?’. The focus is 
not on the content, but on the (motives of the) speaker of the utterance. 
III  The bridge between argument and conclusion is a topos. 
The weather is beautiful, so let’s go for a walk can be divided into an argument A (the 
weather is beautiful) and a conclusion C (let’s go for a walk). To go from an argument 
to a conclusion, a bridge between the two is necessary. The speaker supposes there is 
a principle that bridges the gap between the weather and the walk, such as Warmth 
makes a walk pleasant (Ducrot 1996, lecture IV). The speaker also supposes that the 
addressee is familiar with this principle.  
Ducrot calls this principle a topos, which ensures the validity or the legitimacy of 
the move from A to C. A topos is true in general (exceptions are possible; a walk in the 
hot desert is not necessarily pleasant, although warm), represented as a shared belief 
(i.e. a belief which a certain group of people already accepts), and it is scalar (the 
warmer the weather, the more pleasant the walk) (ibid.). 
IV  The construal configuration and the function of complementation 
Every utterance by a speaker is meant for an addressee: there are two subjects of 
conceptualization involved in every communicative event. It is an invitation to 
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entertain an object of conceptualization1 in a certain way. The object of 
conceptualization contains two parts, to express e.g. foreground/background or 
topic/focus. This is illustrated by the two circles on O-level. These four parts are 
illustrated in the construal configuration in Figure 1 (from Verhagen 2005). The object 
of conceptualization is on O-level, the subjects of conceptualization are on S-level. 
 
 
 
Although this structure is ‘present’ in all utterances, not all the aspects of the construal 
configuration are always marked in utterances. There are utterances that do not mark 
the subject of conceptualization and may thus be called ‘objective’, e.g. John owns a 
horse (Verhagen 2005: 17). There is no marking of perspective; Verhagen calls this a 
“non-perspectivized utterance” (p. 106).2 That ‘objective’ clauses are not purely 
objective and are always linked to some topos and oriented towards a certain 
conclusion, shows the addition of so or but: John owns a horse, but he is actually very 
poor or so he must be rich. (cf. Verhagen 2005). 
Figure 2 shows an illustration of such an utterance; bold lines resemble ‘marked in 
the language’, dotted lines resemble ‘not marked in the language’. 
 
                                                             
1
 ‘Object of conceptualization’ is called ‘Content’ in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & 
Mackenzie 2008), or ‘State of Affairs’ by Rijksbaron (e.g. 2006). 
2
 There are utterances that may not represent any object of conceptualization and seem to play only 
between the subjects: interjections, greetings, apologies, calls for attention. Verhagen mentions also 
the “non-interactional” signs of disgust or frustration. Personally, I doubt the existence of non-
interactional signs. It means that one would curse as loud when he bumps his toe if nobody is around. 
 
Figure 1. Construal configuration (Verhagen 2005). 
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In complementation constructions, e.g. I think John owns a horse, the speaker instructs 
the addressee to construe the object of conceptualization (in the complement clause) 
in a way that is specified by the matrix clause (Verhagen 2005: 97). This is not an 
‘objective’ utterance anymore, because subjectivity is marked by language: by the 
English construction I think (that). In this expression, both the conceptualizer and the 
object of conceptualization are marked. The matrix clause ‘links’ the S-level to the O-
level. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
A third possibility is to add subjectivity, without making explicit whose perspective 
is spoken of. This happens in an utterance like Obviously/Unfortunately/It is obvious 
that/Problem is that John owns a horse. Something being obvious or fortunate is not an 
aspect of the object, but of the way the object is entertained. The addressee is invited 
to entertain the object as obvious or fortunate. The speaker does not make it explicit 
to whom it is obvious or (un)fortunate that John owns a horse. By default, the 
addressee interprets the perspective to be that of the speaker (cf. Verhagen 2005: 
134). In Figure 4, these impersonal subjective constructions are illustrated. 
 
 
Figure 3. Construal configuration for first-person perspective (e.g. I think 
John owns a horse). (From Verhagen 2005). 
 
Figure 2. Construal configuration in ‘objective’ or non-perspectivized 
utterances (e.g. John owns a horse). (From Verhagen 2005). 
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A fourth possibility is to add subjectivity by making explicit that it is the view of a third 
person to which the addressee is invited to entertain: Peter thinks that John owns a 
horse. The same invitation, to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer towards 
an object of conceptualization, is expressed in a complementation sentence with a 
matrix verb in third person. The speaker commits to the stance of the third person at 
least temporarily. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
(2) a. John owns a horse 
b. I think John owns a horse 
c. It is obvious/Problem is that John owns a horse 
d. Peter thinks that John owns a horse 
…so he must be rich. 
 
All the above mentioned examples (repeated in (2a-d)) are an argument for the same 
conclusion (have the same argumentative orientation), e.g. so he must be rich. The 
difference between the sentences above is that the argumentative strength is not 
 
Figure 5. Construal configuration for third person perspective (e.g. Peter 
thinks John owns a horse). (From Verhagen 2005). 
 
Figure 4. Construal configuration for impersonal subjective constructions 
(e.g. Unfortunately, John owns a horse). (From Verhagen 2005). 
38 3  |  Theoretical framework: intersubjectivity, argumentativity and desirability 
 
identical. The force with which the addressee is invited is stronger in (2a) and weaker 
in (2b) and (2d). 
 
In chapter 4, section 2, the intersubjectivity view on complementation is more 
elaborated. 
V  Types of subjectivity: epistemic and evaluative stances towards an object of 
conceptualization 
Every utterance is an invitation to the addressee to entertain the object of 
conceptualization in a particular way. Information about this particular way is added in 
an illocutionary predicate (complementation) or modifier,3 e.g. I think, probably, I 
promise, I hope, hopefully, I fear, unfortunately, presumably. Verhagen (2005: 135, 
(71)) formulates complementation construction as in (3). The just mentioned modifiers 
and predicates fill X, the complement or content of the clause is in B. This formulation 
might be extended to illocutionary modifiers such as probably and hopefully. 
 
(3) Complementation Construction 2, generalized (Dutch) 
Construction form: [A[X predicate]dat[B…] ] 
Construction meaning: ENTERTAIN CONTENT OF B AS X.  
 
All these different manners or stances can be seen as modalities, which many theories 
about modality have tried to categorize (see Nuyts 2006). Two types seem to be the 
most general: epistemic stance and evaluative stance. A speaker expresses his 
epistemic stance when he expresses some degree of certainty/probability. The 
speaker’s evaluative stance (or that of a third person or the community) is his opinion 
as to how desirable the object is.4 I treat desirability and positive evaluative stance as 
two sides of the same coin, i.e., some object is desirable if the subject has a positive 
evaluative stance towards it and vice versa. Similarly for undesirability and negative 
evaluative stance. 
Since the analysis of μή in chapter 4 will focus on evaluative stance and 
desirability, the given examples will be only in this direction and not about epistemic 
stance.  
 
Not only are there different stances towards the object, also the force with which the 
addressee is invited to entertain the stance varies (see above in IV). Because of these 
                                                             
3
 Illocutionary predicate or modifier: term from Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008). 
4
 I treat evaluative stance as a combination of deontic modality (degree of moral desirability) and 
boulomaic modality (degree of the speaker’s liking or disliking of the state of affairs) (definitions in 
brackets from Nuyts (2006)).  
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differences in argumentative strength, many constructions exist to express evaluative 
stance with various forces. If the speaker wants to express his opinion about the 
addressee performing an action, he chooses among e.g. an imperative clause, a 
complement clause (e.g. want, hope, would like…), a conditional clause,5 and many 
more. It is a basic function of communication to express evaluative stance. 
VI  Evaluative stance: Desirability as a descriptive concept6 
Due to the large influence of logics on semantics, until recently desirability was not 
seen as a semantic property of words (Akatsuka 1997: 323). That seems odd, since 
desire and repulsion are such basic functions in any living creature. It might not ‘know’ 
or ‘think’, but it always ‘wants’ or ‘repels’, for his own good or that of his species.  
Evaluative stance can be seen as a continuous scale with a positive and a negative 
end. Languages use many different ways to express evaluative stance, lexical and 
grammatical categories: adverbs and interjections (unfortunately, alas), matrix verbs (I 
hope, I fear,7 you must), moods (imperative, prohibitive), adjectives (good, reasonable, 
bad, ugly,8 dirty9), demonstratives (English construction that…of yours, Latin pronoun 
iste), conjunctions (Dutch mits), conditionals. In this section, some examples of 
desirability as a necessary semantic property are given. 
Daalder (2006, 2009) describes the meaning of the Dutch conditional conjunction 
mits ‘provided that’ in the construction Q, MITS P: “Q implies the existence of some 
specific desirability, for the fulfillment of which P names a strict (“necessary”) 
condition.” (2009: 242). The conjunction mits can be only used if Q is evaluated 
positively, and Q will be evaluated as such by the addressee when mits is used. 
Both the Dutch verbs beloven ‘promise’ and dreigen ‘threat’, in impersonal use, 
have the meaning of being expected. The difference between the two is defined by the 
value +/-desirability. Consider the sentence Het belooft/dreigt te gaan regenen ‘It 
promises/threatens to rain’. Farmers might use the first verb after a dry period, girls 
with stylized hair the second verb (Verhagen 1995). 
Akatsuka (1997: 323-4; 1999: 201) argues that “conditionals are an important 
device for encoding the speaker’s evaluative stance of desirability”. The traditional 
focus on the logic of conditionals, the truth-conditional approach and Fauconnier’s 
more cognitive approach using mental spaces (1985), did not reveal the function of 
conditionals in everyday language. Akatsuka claims that negative conditionals, e.g. If 
                                                             
5
 See VI, on desirability in conditional clauses and chapter 4, section 5. 
6
 Descriptive concept: term from Daalder (2009: 242). 
7
 From Nuyts (2007). 
8
 The word ugly is etymologically related to fear. Middle English, from Old Norse uggligr, from uggr 
‘fear’; akin to Old Norse ugga ‘to fear’ (http://www.merriam-webster.com) 
9
 From Ducrot (1996). 
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you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you, express the speaker’s prediction, “undesirable leads 
to undesirable”, and the speaker’s attitude “I don’t want it to happen”. They are used 
typically for warnings and precautions. She found that in everyday language use, 
conditionals either have the form “desirable-leads-to-desirable” (“I want it to happen”; 
predictive conditionals) or “undesirable-leads-to-undesirable” (“I do not want it to 
happen”; negative conditionals).10 Rarely, the two parts differed for +/-desirability. 
The notion of desirability as a semantic concept cannot be ignored. 
VII  Three motives for human communication 
According to Tomasello (2005: 87), human communication has three basic motives: 
 
 requesting  
(I want you to do something to help me—requesting help or information) 
 informing  
(I want you to know something because I think it well help or interest you) 
 sharing  
(I want you to feel something so that we can share attitudes/feelings 
together) 
 
Expressing an aversion to something, a negative evaluative stance towards some idea, 
is a way of sharing. The speaker invite the addressee to adopt this stance, and when 
they have the same stance towards something they are bonding. Gossiping and 
complaining about the weather are examples of this behavior. The speaker is not 
informing the addressee about the weather,11 and probably (when gossiping) the 
addressee already knew what their colleague had done; they only share their 
evaluative stances towards it. Neither is the speaker asking the addressee to change 
the weather or change the behavior of their colleague: the expression of his aversion is 
not a request. 
With some constructions, however, the speaker expresses his aversion to a 
situation and expresses that he thinks the addressee is capable to change or prevent 
                                                             
10
 This observation has consequences for the interpretation of conditionals. Take the example: “If you 
behave nicely (P), we will go to McDonalds (Q).” Traditional logic gives that if NOT-P, Q still might be 
true. This is not how we interpret this in everyday language use; the only possible outcome of NOT-P is 
NOT-Q. The way Akatsuka treats conditionals is very similar to Ducrot’s view of topoi and arguments 
(1996, lecture IV).  
11
 Although that might be something that happens at the same time, it is not the goal or motive of the 
speaker. When a speaker utters a complaint, the addressee is expected to react on that, instead of 
the content of the complaint.  
A: I hate that it rained on my birthday.  
B: #Oh, did it? (Speaker A feels left alone; communication stranded. He might make another attempt: 
Yeah, and I hate it.) 
B: Oh, did it? Yeah, that’s stupid. 
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that situation. Implicitly, or explicitly in some cases, the speaker asks the addressee to 
do something about it. This is typically the case with imperatives, prohibitives and 
conditional clauses.12 These constructions do more than just share an evaluative 
stance: they request help from the addressee to avert the undesirable situation, and 
even make him responsible for this task. They let the addressee know that the speaker 
expects the addressee to take responsibility for the situation. Addressees know this, 
because the speaker uses a conventional construction for these requests. 
Why would an addressee take over the evaluative stance or take responsibility? I 
propose, based on Tomasello (2005), that we have an instinct to cooperate with the 
other. It is in our best interest to want what the other wants. Ignoring the expression of 
a wish or aversion may have bad consequences for your social life (in the case of 
requests), or for your health (in the case of expressions of fear), which is considered 
incredibly dangerous by our prehistoric instincts. If you ignore a request, it is 
considered impolite (and the speaker loses face in the sense of Brown & Levinson 
1987). If you ignore someone’s expression of fear for a bear or lightning, you might not 
recognize the danger with all its consequences. Not having the same taste or disgust 
about food or music or other customs might have an influence on your place in the 
group. 
Something may be (un)desired by the speaker or by the community (uttered by 
the speaker). The instinct may be formulated as: Be as the other or the community, 
therefore: Desire what is desired. The addressee coordinates with the stance of the 
speaker; in case of an evaluative stance: ‘I desire that too’ or ‘I repel that too’. The next 
step would be (planning to) undertaking an action.  
3. Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to sketch a theoretical background for my hypothesis in 
chapter 4.  
In the argumentative and intersubjective approach sketched above, all 
communication is meant to influence the cognition and/or behavior of the addressee. 
An utterance is an invitation from the speaker to the addressee to entertain an object 
of conceptualization in a certain way (if expressed). By ‘a certain way’, at least 
epistemic and evaluative stance are meant. The starting point of my analysis is that μή 
expresses a negative evaluative stance (“repelling particle”, Kvičala in Kühner & Gerth 
(1904)). When expressing an evaluative stance, the speaker expresses the degree of 
desirability of the object according to himself, a third person or the community. That 
desirability is an important notion in semantics is shown by e.g. Akatsuka (1997, 1999) 
                                                             
12
 These and other constructions will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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and Daalder (2009). A (negative) evaluative stance is found in utterances that have 
‘sharing’ or ‘requesting’ for a motive for communication. 
 
 
 4  |  Analysis: common characteristics of 
constructions with μή 
1. Introduction 
“μή however had (…) not at all the meaning of negation in the beginning, but was 
only a rejecting, repelling particle.”  
Kvičala (1856) 
 
“μή [negates] subjectively, (…) when something from the subjective point of view of 
the speaker is negated, i.e. if only in the will or in the idea of the speaker not-being is 
meant. (…) an act of the imagination or of the will of the speaker is expressed.”  
Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178) 
 
In the previous chapters, the problem of μή has become clear: it cannot be logical 
negation, because that causes difficulties in some constructions. We find μή in 
complements of verbs of fear, verbs of interdiction, but also verbs of wish and deontic 
constructions. We find μή in questions, where it does not follow the pattern in which 
negated questions are rhetorical questions, but keeps a negative value. And we see οὐ 
and μή used together in the same clause, without cancelling one another’s negative 
value. But we cannot deny that μή means ‘not’ in conditional clauses, for example. In 
this chapter I look for features that above and other constructions have in common. 
The idea of Kvičala and Kühner & Gerth, that μή is a repelling particle, is the 
starting point for my analysis, which has an intersubjective approach. I start with the 
following hypothesis: μή does not function as logical negation on the scale of epistemic 
stance (logical negation in Greek is οὐ), but it functions on the scale of evaluative 
stance, expressing undesirability.  
During examining different constructions with μή from Aristophanes’ comedies 
(see 1.4 below), the view of μή as a repelling particle will appear to be not sufficient. 
Three semantic characteristics of constructions with μή are necessary to describe all 
the constructions; the ‘problem’ of μή may be solved by making use of the prototype 
theory and family resemblances (Geeraerts 1997). 
 
This chapter continues as follows. In section 1, I discuss how undesirability fits in the 
intersubjectivity account (1.1), and how negation is already described by Verhagen 
(2005) (1.2); I connect μή to the motives for human communication (Tomasello 2008) 
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(1.3) and then the corpus from Aristophanes is described that is used as a source for 
the constructions with μή (1.4). In the rest of the chapter, the constructions with μή 
are compared to find the common characteristics. In section 2, complement clauses as 
found in Aristophanes are treated. In section 3, prohibitive clauses and other main 
clauses with μή are distinguished and in section 4 main clauses with the οὐ μή 
construction. Conditional clauses are treated in section 5. In section 6, it is shown how 
these constructions can be connected through family resemblances. 
1.1 Negative evaluative stance in the intersubjective approach 
Before we examine the constructions in the following sections, I quickly sketch the 
place and function of undesirability and negation in the intersubjectivity approach. 
The object of conceptualization (on the O-level) is separated from the subjects of 
conceptualization (conceptualizers, S-level), namely the speaker and the addressee (cf. 
chapter 3). Undesirability is not a property of the object of conceptualization, but only 
exists in the perspective of the subject of conceptualization (cf. Verhagen 2005: 133), 
hence the term evaluative stance. It is an aspect of the construal relation between the 
O-level and S-level (cf. Figure 1; further elaborated in section 2). This is true for all 
evaluating expressions, e.g. problem, problematic, good, luckily. By using μή, the 
addressee is invited to entertain the object of conceptualization as undesirable, to 
adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the object. Μή does not express who 
evaluates the object of conceptualization as undesirable—that is expressed by other 
parts of the utterance or is part of the common ground.1  
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 Daalder (2009) argues the same for the Dutch conjunction mits. 
 
Figure 1. Construal configuration with μή.  
(After Verhagen 2006: 326, figure 3.)  
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1.2 Negation and negative evaluation in the intersubjective approach: invalid 
conclusions and mental spaces 
That μή is often considered negation is not strange: in some constructions, the 
function of μή can be compared to (and comes close to) the function of logical 
negation. Verhagen (2005: 32, 44) describes negation as follows:  
 
“Linguistic negation can be said to have a special function in regulating an 
addressee’s cognitive coordination with other points of view. The addressee is 
invited to adopt (at least for the time being) a particular epistemic stance 
towards some idea, and to abandon another one that is inconsistent with it—
possibly one that the addressee might entertain himself [emphasis mine]. These 
kinds of cognitive consequences do not necessarily follow when there is no 
linguistic negation. (…) [it] has the function of directing the addressee to infer 
that certain conclusions are invalid.”  
 
Negation, i.e. logical negation on the epistemic scale, invites the addressee to do three 
things, according to Verhagen: adopt an epistemic stance towards an idea, abandon an 
inconsistent stance, and infer that certain conclusions are invalid. 
Other English words have the same impact as negation: little [chance], barely. 
Consider the sentence There is no/little/barely a chance that the operation will be 
successful—so let’s not take the risk (after Verhagen 2005: 45).2 The phrase there is no 
chance has the same argumentative orientation, points in the direction of the same 
conclusion as there is little chance or there is barely a chance. These three words invite 
the addressee to abandon the idea of ‘a chance to success’, and to infer that this 
conclusion ‘pursuing the operation’ is invalid, based on the epistemic stance that the 
addressee is invited to adopt and on a relevant topos, such as Low chance > no 
operation. The difference between the three words no/little/barely is the 
argumentative strength.  
Invalid conclusions after expressions with negative evaluative stance 
Although not discussed in Verhagen, there are also English words that a speaker uses 
to invite the addressee to adopt a particular evaluative stance towards some idea and 
to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. These are e.g. the four possible attitudes to 
danger: courageous, rash, prudent, timorous (Ducrot 1996: 186). Courageous and rash 
have the same informational value, but express a different evaluative stance; similar 
for prudent and timorous. Both words invite the addressee to infer a different 
                                                             
2
 The argumentative direction of an utterance can be found by adding a clause with the conjunction 
so (identical argumentative direction) or but (opposite argumentative direction) (Ducrot 1996; 
Verhagen 2005: 53). 
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conclusion, which is illustrated in example (1).3 Note that the conclusions inferred 
contain an evaluative stance as well. 
 
(1) A:  Will Thomas be a good husband? 
B1:  Thomas is a courageous man, so he’ll make a good husband  
B2:  Thomas is a rash man, but he’ll make good husband  
B3:  #Thomas is a courageous man, but he’ll make a good husband 
B4:  #Thomas is a rash man, so he’ll make a good husband  
 
Rash expresses a negative evaluative stance towards Thomas’ thoughts about danger, 
and it invalidates the conclusion of Thomas being a good husband, making use of a 
topos like Responsible men make good husbands.  
Courageous on the other hand does not seem to necessarily invalidate the 
conclusion of Thomas being a bad husband. Apparently words with a negative 
evaluative stance are a stronger invitation to infer that certain conclusions are invalid 
than words with a positive evaluative strength (cf. Finocchario 1992: 66). Example (2) 
illustrates this idea. 
 
(2) a. Thomas is a rash/timorous/avaricious/lavish man, who lives far away, so he is 
not a good husband.  
b. ?# Thomas is a courageous/prudent/thrifty/generous man, who lives nearby, 
so he is not a bad husband. 
 
The undesirability marker (“repelling particle”) μή functions in the same way as rash. 
Μή is used by the speaker to invite the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative 
stance towards some idea, and to abandon another stance or idea that is inconsistent 
with it, and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. The conclusions that are valid 
contain a negative evaluative stance as well. When μή is used, the sentence is oriented 
towards the conclusion: this is undesirable, keep far from it. 
Two mental spaces with x and not-x 
Another characteristic of logical (epistemic) negation is the opening of two mental 
spaces (in the sense of Fauconnier (1994)). Verhagen (2005: 29, ex. (1)) illustrates this 
with the following example:  
 
                                                             
3
 Other examples of words with the same informative value but with opposite argumentative 
directions: thrifty, avaricious; nearby, far. 
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(3) This time, there was no such communication [about the plans]. It’s1 a pity 
because it2 could have resulted in greater participation by employers.  
[indexing mine] 
 
In example (3), the two instances of it refer to two different situations: a situation in 
which there is no communication (it1) and a situation in which there is communication 
(it2). The negation no opens two mental spaces, one with NOT-P and one with P, and 
both of them can be referred to in the following discourse. 
In some constructions with μή, as we shall see later, the speaker invites the 
addressee to imagine a world with NOT-P, in other words, to open a mental space with 
NOT-P. In these constructions, the function of μή comes very close to the function of 
logical negation. This is remarkable from the perspective that μή is only an 
undesirability marker. In section 3, this characteristic of certain constructions with μή is 
further elaborated. 
Negative evaluative stance and logical negation  
 
“Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought.”  
(Shakespeare, King Henry IV Part 2 (1597)). 
 
Negative evaluative stance and logical negation are closely linked. Horn (1989: 272 ff.) 
explains that we have the tendency to polarize concepts: something is either good or 
evil, clean or dirty, black or white, p v q. The expression that something is evil is easily 
interpreted as ¬good. Negative epistemic stance and negative evaluative stance are 
often mixed in everyday language use. This is seen in some phenomena, which I 
describe below.  
A phenomenon in which we can clearly see the close connection between 
negative evaluative stance and logical negation is the English and German prefix un-, 
in-, and a- (Jespersen 1917: 144). These prefixes are only joint to adjectives with a 
positive evaluative meaning (e-pos in Horn 1989: 274) to then form a negative 
evaluative meaning (e-neg). Jespersen: “most adjectives with un- or in- have a 
depreciatory sense: we have unworthy, undue, imperfect, etc., but it is not possible to 
form similar adjectives from wicked, foolish, or terrible. Van Ginneken (Linguistique 
psychologique 208) counted the words in un- in a German dictionary and found that 
98% of the substantives and 85% of the adjectives had "une signification defavorable".” 
A caveat is necessary here: although unhappy may have the same informative 
value as not happy, it does not function the same. Unlike not happy, unhappy does not 
open a mental space with not-x, to which can be referred to in the following discourse 
(Verhagen 2005: ch. 2). 
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Jespersen (1917) mentions other words with a negative evaluative connotation 
that are used as a negation in some European languages, such as devil (e.g. devil I go in 
there), deuce ‘two points on a dice, the lowest score’, Irish sorra ‘devil, sorrow’, pox 
(disease), (Jespersen 1917: 31-35).  
He also mentions conditional clauses in which undesirability is turned into a 
negative evaluative stance. “Another popular way of denying something is by putting it 
in a conditional clause with I am a villain or something similar in the main clause (…). A 
variant is the devil take me or I will be damned etc. in the main clause.” (Jespersen 
(1917: 26-27)). I will be damned is surely something undesirable: the speaker does not 
want it to be true (evaluative stance) or, in everyday use, does not believe it to be true 
(epistemic stance). The wish is father to the thought. I discuss conditionals in section 5. 
1.3 Cooperative motives for communicating and μή 
As described in chapter 3, according to Tomasello (2005: 87), human communication 
has three basic motives: requesting (I want you to do something to help me—
requesting help or information), informing (I want you to know something because I 
think it well help or interest you), and sharing (I want you to feel something so that we 
can share attitudes/feelings together). 
If we assume that μή is primarily an undesirability marker, we may expect it to be 
used when a speaker shares his attitude. He invites the addressee to adopt this 
negative evaluative stance, and when they have the same stance towards something 
they are bonding. Some constructions, however, we have already seen to express 
requests to act: typically imperatives (purpose clauses; section 2.4) and prohibitives 
(section 3); conditionals are uttered with this motive as well (section 5). In these 
constructions, the speaker expresses aversion to a situation and he expresses that he 
thinks the addressee is capable to change or prevent that situation. Implicitly, or 
explicitly in some cases, the speaker asks the addressee to do something about it. 
These constructions do more than just share an evaluative stance: they request help 
from the addressee to avert the undesirable situation, and make him responsible for 
this task. 
Constructions with μή are normally not used for the motive of informing the 
addressee about interesting things in the world. It is not usual to express an epistemic 
and evaluative stance in one clause. This has to do with the “one-commitment-per-
clause principle” (Nuyts 2009), to which I will return in section 4. 
1.4 Τhe corpus 
To find commonalities between the different constructions with μή and some 
information about the frequencies of these commonalities, a corpus was composed of 
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sentences with μή from one writer. That way, the problem of dealing with different 
periods of Greek is reduced (although not removed, see below). The corpus contains all 
312 sentences with μή from 6 comedies of Aristophanes: Acharnians, Birds, Clouds, 
Knights, Peace, Wasps (abbreviated respectively: Ach., Av., Nu., Eq., Pax, V.). These 
plays were ‘randomly selected’, i.e. these were the first results shown in Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae (TLG).  
The plays of Aristophanes (approx. 446–386 BCE) were chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, they consist of mostly dialogues. There is a speaker and a listener, reacting to 
each other, as opposed to e.g. Herodotus’ Histories. Secondly, the language of the 
comedies is more colloquial than that of tragedies, and I am more interested in 
colloquial language use than ‘literary’ language. 
The language of Aristophanes’ comedies 
The language of Aristophanes’ comedies is said to approximate colloquial Attic Greek: 
the Greek of the Athenians in the streets (albeit in meter, not in prose). This is in 
contrast to the language of tragedy, which aims to distance itself from colloquial Attic 
(Zimmerman 2014). However, there are some influences from tragedy, lyric, and from 
other dialects than Attic. Most of these influences are found on the level of vocabulary, 
morphology and phonology (cf. Willi 2010).  
López Eire (1996) mentions some of the (lexical and morphological) features of 
colloquial Attic Greek: many metaphors, proverbial and semi-proverbial expressions, 
obscenities, insults. López Eire links the features of colloquial language to two basic 
functions of language in general: the function of expression (of e.g. admiration, grief) 
and conation (expressing desire, “evil desire”, curse), more than the function of 
reference (ibid: 75). 
Relevant for the topic in this thesis is the use of parataxis and particles. “Parataxis 
is far more frequent in comedy than in higher literary genres (obviously because 
spoken language avoids more-complicated hypotactic structures), and certain particles 
or function words are exceedingly common because of the oral stylization of comic 
language.” (Willi 2010: 484; Willi 2003: 261). 
Corpus 
The corpus contains all 312 sentences with μή from the above mentioned 6 comedies. 
Sentences with compound forms of μή (e.g. pronoun μηδείς ‘not one’, and particle 
μηδέ ‘and not’) were excluded from this corpus for two reasons. Because this research 
is specifically concerned with the problems for μή as negation (verbs of fear, after 
negative matrix verbs, combination with οὐ), the pronominal forms of μή were 
excluded, such as μηδείς ‘not one’. This research is about the single particle and not 
about the derived forms, that may or may not function in a different way (and asks for 
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a separate investigation). The forms μηδέ and μήτε ‘and not’, that might function in 
the same way as μή does, were excluded for reasons of space. 
 
The corpus was categorized into 6 categories, based on form. The particle μή is part of 
the main clause, the complement clause (finite and non-finite), the antecedent 
(condition, protasis) of a conditional construction, a purpose satellite clause, a noun 
phrase (including relative clause), or a satellite clause which is not a purpose clause. In 
Table 1, the distribution of the sentences over the categories is shown. 
 
Table 1. Type of clauses with μή    
Clause type Frequency Percent 
Main clause 98 32 
Complement clause 50 16 
- non-finite - 31 - 10 
- finite - 19 - 6 
Conditional clause 102 33 
Purpose satellite clause
4
 33 11 
Noun phrase 17 5 
Other satellite clause 12 4 
Total 312 100 
 
In the rest of the chapter, these constructions with μή are compared to find the 
common characteristics.5 In section 2, complement clauses as found in Aristophanes 
are treated. In section 3, prohibitive clauses (imperatives and subjunctives) and other 
main clauses with μή are distinguished and in section 4 clauses with the οὐ μή 
construction. Conditional clauses are treated in section 5. In section 6, it is shown how 
these constructions are connected through family resemblances.  
2. Μή in complement clauses 
One of the problems addressed in chapter 2 is μή in complement clauses after verbs of 
fear and negative orders. For this reason, this chapter starts by looking at the 
complement clauses.  
The corpus as described above contains 50 complement clauses. They are 
complements of different types of matrix verbs. The matrix verbs were categorized in 6 
semantic categories:  
- verbs of fear (δείδω, φοβέομαι ‘fear, be afraid’),  
- deontic
6
 constructions (χρή ‘one ought’, δεινόν ‘terrible’),  
                                                             
4
 See for the difference between purpose complements and purpose satellites section 2.4 of this 
chapter. 
5
 Due to limited space, noun phrases and satellite clauses are not discussed in this thesis. 
6
 Nuyts (2001): Deontic modality: indication of the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs. 
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- verbs that express a wish or order (e.g. βούλομαι ‘want’, ἐθέλω ‘want’, εὔχομαι 
‘pray’, ἅπτομαι ‘(touch to) beg’, ὀμνύμι ‘swear’, ἀναπείθω ‘convince’, δοκεῖ μοι 
‘seems [good] to me, I decide’, κηρύττω ‘announce’),  
- verbs that express a negative wish or order (e.g. ἀπαγορεύω ‘forbid’, ἀπολέγω 
‘forbid’, ἀπαυδάω ‘forbid’, φείδομαι ‘spare, use not’, παύω ‘stop’, ἀρνέομαι 
‘deny’),  
- verbs that introduce a purpose (e.g. εὐλαβέομαι ‘be aware’, προνοέομαι ‘foresee’, 
ὀφείλω ‘be responsible for’, σπεύδω ‘hasten’, φυλάττω ‘keep guard’, ἀθρέω 
‘watch’, διασκοπέω ‘consider’, τηρέω ‘take care of’, φράζομαι ‘beware of’), or 
when the matrix verb is missing, the clause was introduced by conjunction ὅπως 
- verbs that express an ability (δύναμαι ‘can, be able to’, ἐπίσταμαι ‘know (how)’).  
 
In Table 2, the frequencies of these categories of matrix verbs of the 50 complement 
clauses are shown, as well as the form of the complement clause (finite or non-finite). 
 
Table 2. Semantics of the matrix verb and form of complement clause 
 non-finite  finite  Total 
fear  5 5 
negative wish/order 6  6 
wish, order 13  13 
deontic 8  8 
purpose
7
 3 14 17 
dynamic 1  1 
Total 31 19 50 
 
2.1 Negative evaluative stance towards object of conceptualization 
Let us consider a few examples of these complement constructions: verbs of fear and 
negative matrix verbs, such as forbid. 
 
(4) Fear: δέδοικε μὴ διαφθαρῶ
8
  
He is afraid I should get lost  
(5) Negative order: ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν
9
  
I forbid having the discussion of paying a wage to the Thracians  
                                                             
7
 Purpose clauses and dynamic constructions seem to function a bit different than the former 4 types, 
and will be treated in sections 2.4. 
8
 Fragment from: 
ταῦτ’ οὖν περί μου δέδοικε μὴ διαφθαρῶ (Ar. V. 1358) 
those PRT about me fear.3SG.PF MH get.lost.1SG.AOR  
‘He is afraid I should get lost’ 
9
 Fragment from:  
ἀλλ’ ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν τοῖς Θρᾳξὶ περὶ μισθοῦ (Ar. Ach. 169) 
but forbid.1SG.PRS MH do.INF discussion.ACC to.the Thacians.DAT about wage 
‘but I do oppose the discussion of paying a wage to the Thracians’ 
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(6) Positive verb of wish: ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον
10
  
He tried to persuade him to wear the cloak no longer  
(7) Deontic construction: τὸ μὲν σὸν σῶμα χρὴ πληγῶν ἀθῷον εἶναι, τοὐμὸν δὲ 
μή
11
  
 Your body ought to be exempt from blows and mine not 
(8) No matrix verb: μὴ ἐγχάνῃ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας
12
  
Let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped 
 
In the translations, μή is translated in different ways: sometimes with ‘not’ and 
sometimes ‘neutral’ or ‘positive’. However, if we look at the complements without 
their matrix clause, μή is always interpreted the same: the object of conceptualization 
is undesirable. The speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative evaluative 
stance and to invalidate conclusions that are inconsistent with this stance. In Table 3, 
the complements are shown split from the matrix clause (cf. Verhagen 2005: 96). It is 
clear that the most basic content of the examples above is expressed in the 
complements and not in the matrix clause, and that there is no negative/expletive 
difference between the sentences.  
 
Table 3. Examples (4)-(8) simplified and split at matrix and complement clause. 
Category Matrix Complement English 
(4’) Fear δέδοικε  
 
μὴ διαφθαρῶ ‘He is afraid I should get lost’ 
(5’) Negative 
order 
ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ‘I forbid having the discussion 
of paying a wage to the 
Thracians’ 
(6’) Positive verb 
of wish 
ἀνέπειθεν 
αὐτὸν  
μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον ‘He tried to persuade him to 
wear the cloak no longer’ 
(7’) Deontic 
construction 
χρὴ τοὐμὸν δὲ μή 
[πληγῶν ἀθῷον 
εἶναι] 
‘Your body ought to be 
exempt from blows and mine 
not’ 
(8’) No matrix 
verb 
— μὴ ἐγχάνῃ γέροντας 
ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν 
Ἀχαρνέας 
‘let him not taunt [us] old 
Acharnians with his having 
escaped’ 
 
                                                             
10
 Fragment from: 
ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον (…), ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἐπείθετο. (Ar. V. 116) 
convince.3SG.IMPF him MH wear.INF cloak, the other not convince.3SG.IMPF.PASS 
“He tried to convince him to not wear the cloak, but the other was not convinced”. 
11
 After: 
πῶς γὰρ τὸ μὲν σὸν σῶμα χρὴ πληγῶν ἀθῷον εἶναι, τοὐμὸν δὲ μή; (Ar. Nu. 1414) 
how PRT the PRT your body ought blows.GEN free be.INF the.mine PRT MH? 
‘For why ought your body to be exempt from blows and mine not?’ 
12
 Fragment from:  
μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνῃ ποτὲ μηδέ περ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας (Ar. Ach. 221)  
MH PRT scoff.at.3SG.SBJ ever MH.and PRT old.ACC.PL being.PTC.ACC.PL escaped.PTC.SG.NOM Acharnian.ACC.PL 
let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped 
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The sentences (4) to (8) have in common that the conceptualizer (whether identical to 
the speaker, a 3rd person or impersonal) has a negative evaluative stance towards the 
object of conceptualization in the complement clause. This construal relation between 
the O-level and the S-level, expressed by μή, is shown in Figure 2 (repetition of Figure 
1). 
 
 
2.2 The role of the matrix clause 
If we would swap the matrix verbs of (5) ἀπαγορεύω ‘forbid’, (6) ἀναπείθω ‘persuade’ 
and (7) χρή ‘ought’, the argumentative direction and conclusion of the addressee does 
not change: the addressee understands that he is expected to think of the object of 
conceptualization as undesirable and to invalidate certain conclusions (and somebody 
expects him to act on it). The matrix clause can even be “omitted” under some 
conditions, as in (8) (Kühner & Gerth 1904: 221; cf. ch. 2, section 4.1). If the matrix 
clause can be swapped or omitted and the most important message is captured in the 
complement clause, then what is the role of the matrix verb? The intersubjectivity 
approach to complementation is formulated as follows (Verhagen 2005: 97):  
 
“…complementation constructions have the primary function of instructing the 
addressee of an utterance (…) to coordinate cognitively—in a way specified by the 
matrix clause—with another subject of conceptualization in construing the object of 
conceptualization (the latter being represented by the complement clause).” 
 
This means that the matrix clause is part of the instruction: it specifies the way the 
addressee should coordinate cognitively with the other subject of conceptualization. It 
tells the addressee how to treat the object of conceptualization, the content of the 
complement clause. 
 
Figure 2. Construal configuration with μή.  
(After Verhagen 2006: 326, figure 3.)  
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What is expressed with a matrix verb of fear? In the ‘objective’13 use of the verb, 
the subject believes the object of conceptualization will be harmful to him, hence he 
regards the object of conceptualization as undesirable.14 It is an invitation to the 
addressee to coordinate cognitively (feel what the subject feels, or at least understand 
what the subject feels) and, in some cases but not explicitly, act in order to let the 
object of conceptualization not become true. To compare this construction with the 
motives of Tomasello (2005; cf. section 1.3) above: the primary motive to utter this 
construction of fear is to share your attitude. Hopefully, the addressee adopts the 
stance and drops inconsistent ideas (in the case of ‘getting lost’: drop the idea of 
wandering around without caring where you are being desirable), and he starts acting 
in a way that is consistent with the speaker’s and the addressee’s stance towards it. 
But the speaker does not ask for this behavior explicitly with fear, as opposed to e.g. 
forbid. 
With the verb forbid (in 1st person), the speaker expresses that he regards the 
object of conceptualization as undesirable, and that he regards the addressee capable 
of preventing that object of conceptualization. He strongly requests the addressee to 
behave in such a way that the object of conceptualization is not realized. In this 
construction, a second mental space with not-x is opened. The addressee is invited to 
imagine a world with not x. On the go, he guarantees undesirable (harmful?) 
consequences for the addressee, when the addressee acts in the way the subject 
regards as undesirable.15  
The verb persuade expresses (among other) that the subject regards the object of 
conceptualization as desirable, and that he strongly advises the addressee to take over 
this evaluative stance (because of possible consequences). The addressee is capable of 
realizing or (with μή) preventing the object of conceptualization and is requested to do 
so. 
The deontic construction χρή with μή expresses that the community regards the 
object of conceptualization as undesirable; the speaker strongly invites, if not urges, 
the addressee to take over this stance. The instances in the corpus all express a state of 
affairs with μή that lies within the power of the addressee, or at least of an average 
human being, to prevent. So we might conclude that also with this construction a 
                                                             
13
 Nuyts (2007) distinguishes 3 uses for the Dutch verb vrezen ‘fear’: (i) objective use, the description 
of a mental state; (ii) qualificational use, expresses a clash between the state of affairs in the 
complement and the expectations, which are present in context and/or earlier discourse and desired 
by the participants; (iii) interactive use, mitigator of utterance that goes against the expectation of 
the addressee . It is unknown whether Greek δέδοικα and φοβέομαι ‘fear’ have the same three uses. 
14
 Merriam-Webster: fear  “an unpleasant often strong emotion caused by anticipation or awareness 
of danger”. 
15
 Merriam-Webster: forbid “to say that (something) is not allowed”; allow “to regard or treat 
(something) as acceptable”. 
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request is made to the addressee by the speaker to prevent or change the undesirable 
object of conceptualization. 
Except for the complement construction with verbs of fear, the constructions 
above have two characteristics in common. Firstly, they are used to share the speaker’s 
negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization. By using these 
constructions, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative evaluative 
stance. Secondly, they are used to make a request to the addressee to change or 
prevent the undesirable object of conceptualization: at least the addressee is 
considered capable of doing that. Constructions with verbs of fear do not necessarily 
ask for the addressee’s action—their main function is sharing the evaluative stance. 
The verbs above represent points on a scale: they express how urgent it is that 
the addressee takes over the evaluative stance of the subject towards the object of 
conceptualization. One might also say that the matrix verb expresses the intensity of 
the commitment of the speaker/subject. It influences the argumentative strength. 
2.3 Conceptualizer 
In the examples above, we saw already that it is not always the speaker whose 
negative evaluative stance is expressed explicitly. In (4) and (5), the 3rd person is used, 
and an impersonal construction in (7). The intersubjective approach proposes the 
following as to the speaker’s stance with different subjects. The subject of the verb 
influences the addressee’s interpretation of the commitment of the speaker and 
therefore the argumentative strength of an utterance (and the urgency of the request 
or the invitation to adopt the same stance). 
Consider example (9) (after Verhagen 2005: 105): 
 
(9) A: Should this happen? 
B1: I fear that this happens. (δέδοικα μή)  
B2: I forbid you to let this happen. (ἀπαγορεύω μή)  
B3: This ought not to happen. (χρὴ μή)  
B4: He fears that this happens. (δέδοικε μή) 
 
The import of the answer to A’s question is the same in all of B’s utterances: no. The 
sentences differ in the way they express the speaker’s stance towards the object of 
conceptualization. 
In Figure 1 above, it was shown how μή relates the O-level to the S-level. Without 
a matrix verb, it is not made explicit whose evaluative stance is expressed by μή. With a 
matrix verb, the speaker marks this object as a stance of conceptualizer 1. The 
addressee is invited to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer (Verhagen 2005: 
105). This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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The same invitation, to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer and to 
invalidate inconsistent conclusions, is expressed in a complementation sentence with a 
matrix verb in third person, or an impersonal matrix construction. The speaker 
commits to the stance of the third person at least temporarily. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.  
An impersonal construction, e.g. χρή, does not mark whose evaluative stance is 
expressed. It might be the stance of the speaker or of the community. The message is 
the same: the addressee is strongly invited to adopt the stance. The construal 
configuration of impersonal constructions is the same as Figure 1 (only the ‘vertical’ 
relation between the two levels is marked, not one of the conceptualizers is onstage). 
 
 
Impersonal constructions and ‘omitted’ matrix verbs 
The difference between personal constructions (matrix verbs with a subject 
(agent/experiencer)) and impersonal constructions (matrix verbs without an agent-like 
subject) is that personal constructions explicitly invite the addressee to entertain the 
object of conceptualization in the way someone else does, whereas impersonal 
 
Figure 4. Construal configuration for third-person perspective (B3 and B4 
in (8)). After Verhagen (2005: 106, figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3. Construal configuration for first-person perspective (B1 and B2 in 
(8)). After Verhagen (2005: 106, figure 3.2). 
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constructions “’just’ invite the addressee to entertain it in a particular way” (Verhagen 
2005: 133-4). The clause is not explicit about the source of the judgment. “The default 
is that the addressee engages in cognitive coordination with the speaker, the 
assumption being that since this is the person who presents the object of 
conceptualization as [undesirable] to the addressee, he may be taken as holding those 
views in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” (ibid.). 
Therefore, impersonal constructions, such as χρή, or subjunctive clauses without a 
matrix verb, such as example (8) and those treated in section 3, are easily seen as an 
expression of the stance of the speaker. A fortiori, this default is the reason that the 
matrix verb can be omitted. When the speaker utters his own negative evaluative 
stance towards the object of conceptualization, it is not necessary to explicitly mark 
the conceptualizer. It is only necessary to use a matrix verb, when the speaker wants to 
give the addressee more information about his motives: is he sharing or requesting?  
Conceptualizers: frequencies  
In Table 4, frequencies of the different onstage conceptualizers are shown.  
 
Table 4. Matrix verb: subject and mood 
 1st pers 2nd pers 3rd pers impers total 
 subj ind non-
fin 
imper ind inf ind non-
fin 
ind  
- fear  2     1 2  5 
- negative   
wish/order 
 2    1 2 1  6 
- wish, order  4 1  3  3 1 1 12 
- deontic         8 8 
- dynamic     1     2 
- purpose 2   6  1 2 1  12 
Total (mood) 2 8 1 6 4 2 8 5 9 45
16
 
Total (person) 11 12 13 9  
 
In Table 4, the amount of 2nd person subjects is remarkably high. Why would a speaker 
invite the addressee to adopt his own stance? Let’s take a closer look at the forms. The 
3 indicatives17 in the upper part of the table are questions: “Do you want to not…?” in 
                                                             
16
 The total is 45 and not 50, because 6 sentences were left out: they do not have a matrix verb, but 
are clearly a complement of some sort: they start with a conjunction (ὅπως). 
17
 Ar. Ach. 1108, Ar. Ach. 1113, Ar. Av. 1026. 
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the sense of “Will you please not…?”.18 They kindly request the addressee to stop 
doing what they are doing, because the speaker evaluates it negatively.19  
The non-finite form is an infinitive, which is used as an advice or order (request).20 
In purpose clauses, we see a high amount of imperatives and one more infinitive, used 
as an imperative. These are all matrix clauses of purpose complements, in the form: 
Make sure this will not happen. I will come back to the special nature of imperatives in 
section 4 on prohibitives.  
The one 2nd person indicative introducing a dynamic clause is a prediction (and 
thus a strong advice?) for the future: “You will learn/know how to not act…”, shown 
below in example (10). The question arises what dynamic modality has to do with 
desirability. In this case, the object of conceptualization, περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας 
σκαιουργεῖν ‘behave badly towards your parents’, is considered undesirable by the 
speaker and expressed as such. Further research is needed to find out whether other 
complements of dynamic matrix verbs have the same value. 
 
(10) [κἀπιστήσει] καὶ μὴ περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας σκαιουργεῖν (Ar. Nu. 994) 
and.know.2SG.IND.FUT and MH concerning the yourself parents behave.amiss.INF 
‘[and you will learn] and not to behave ill toward your parents’ 
2.4 Purpose clauses 
The final category of matrix verbs with complements containing μή is more 
complicated: the verbs that introduce purpose clauses (“verbs of contriving”, 
Rijksbaron 2006). An example of a sentence is given in (11). 
 
(11) πρὸς ταῦτα τηροῦ μὴ λάβῃς ὑπώπια. (Ar. V. 1386) 
towards that watch.out.2SG.IMPER MH take.2SG.SBJ black.eye.PL 
‘Therefore watch out that I don't blacken your eyes’ 
 
As described above, many different verbs are used in this type of sentences: e.g. 
εὐλαβέομαι ‘be aware’, προνοέομαι ‘foresee’, ὀφείλω ‘be responsible for’, σπεύδω 
‘hasten’, φυλάττω ‘keep guard’, ἀθρέω ‘watch’, διασκοπέω ‘examine’, τηρέω ‘take 
care of’, φράζομαι ‘beware of’. None of these verbs have a meaning that denotes a 
specific action; a common meaning comes close to: ‘imagine this’ or ‘focus’, and 
                                                             
18
 Willi (2003: 179): “The deliberative subjunctive is often replaced by a periphrasis with 
βούλει/βούλεσθε (‘you.SG/PL want’) + subjunctive. This was a common way of formulating an 
utterance like βούλει μυρίσω σε; ‘shall I perfume you?’ (Ar. Lys. 938). (…) The pragmatic function of 
eliciting the addressee’s support is typical for a cooperative, polite, and somewhat self-subordinating 
style.”  
19
 The counterpart of βούλει μὴ + infinitive ‘Will you not…!’ is οὐ βούλει ‘Don’t you want to…?’. 
20
 Ar. Av. 557.  
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‘handle it’ or ‘be responsible’. Again it is noted that the complement clause is the most 
informative part of this sentence. The matrix verb constitutes a frame to indicate that 
some action should follow the conclusion inferred from this evaluative stance—the 
addressee is given responsibility. 
The matrix verbs of the former sections (fear, forbid, ought) express (a) an 
invitation to adopt an evaluative stance and to drop invalid conclusions and in most 
cases (b) information about the commitment of the speaker (e.g. consequences for the 
addressee; whether the motive is sharing or requesting). The purpose clauses express 
an invitation to adopt the evaluative stance, and an invitation to consider this 
evaluative stance so neatly that a plan of action arises. In the sentences with an 
imperative in the matrix clause (the majority), the addressee is given all responsibility 
to prevent the undesirable situation expressed in the complement, so these are clearly 
strong requests. 
The moods of the matrix verbs used in this type are noteworthy. As shown in 
Table 4, 6 out of 12 purpose sentences had a matrix verb in imperative mood, 1 has 
infinitive mood with imperative meaning. The 2 sentences with 1st person are in 
subjunctive mood, of which the function is called ‘adhortative’. That means that 9 
sentences have an imperative-like or hortative-like construction. Only 3 sentences have 
a matrix verb in 3rd person and are merely ‘descriptive’ (“he made sure that not…”). 
From the high amount of matrix verbs in imperative(-like) mood, we may conclude that 
this is the prototype of this type of purpose sentences: the matrix verb has a meaning 
related to “caution/intention/effort” (Willi 2003), is in imperative or hortative 
subjunctive mood, the complement clause contains μή (starts sometimes with ὅπως) 
and is usually in subjunctive form. 
Conjunction ὅπως 
When the speaker asks the addressee to take care of something that is considered 
desirable, the conjunction ὅπως ‘so that’ is used to introduce the complement clause. 
If the complement is undesirable, simple μή (without ὅπως) is normal with verbs of 
caution/intention/effort (Willi 2003: 265). That is why only few21 of the complement 
clauses in my corpus start with the conjunction ὅπως ‘so that’.  
There were 5 clauses22 in the corpus that start with ὅπως with no matrix verb. 
Apparently, the instruction ‘focus at’ is not necessary (or even superfluous) to 
understand that the speaker wants the addressee to adopt a certain evaluative stance 
                                                             
21
 After the verbs ἀθρέω ‘watch’, φυλάττω ‘keep guard’, τηρέω ‘take care of’. ὅπως is also seen once 
after δέδοικα ‘I fear’ (Ar. Eq. 112). 
22
 Ach. 343, Av. 1239, Av. 1494, Nu. 257, Nu. 824. 
Willi (2010): “Since Aristophanes’ contemporary Lysias, an orator with a most unpretentious style, 
avoids ὅπως (ἄν), it may be inferred that at least the number of occurrences of ὅπως (ἄν) in 
Aristophanic comedy is too high for true linguistic realism.” 
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with certain responsibilities. Willi (ibid.) notes that these “imperatival independent 
subordinate clauses introduced by ὅπως” are a colloquialism.23 It might be that ὅπως 
was used so often in this combination, that it has taken over the hortative sense of the 
matrix verb. 
Related to this is the issue of μή being a particle and a conjunction. Greek typically 
uses conjunctions to link every clause to the previous and to express their role in or 
their relation to the context. For this reason, complement clauses introduced by μή 
without a (different) conjunction, led scholars to the conclusion that μή is also a 
conjunction: after matrix verbs of fear it means ‘that’, after verbs of 
caution/intention/effort it means ‘so that’ (e.g. Rijksbaron 2006). But the fact that 
Aristophanes uses sometimes bare μή, and sometimes ὅπως μή, even after a verb of 
fear, leads me to the conclusion that μή may not be a conjunction and that asyndeton 
may be more common than is thought. This discussion is not relevant for the main 
questions in this thesis; in either category, μή invites the addressee to adopt a negative 
evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization and to infer that certain 
conclusions are invalid. The conjunction ὅπως and/or the imperative/adhortative 
invites the addressee to conclude that action is needed and that the utterance should 
be taken as a request. 
2.5 Concluding 
In this section, complement clauses were discussed. The complement clause is the 
most informative part of the sentence: the object of conceptualization is negatively 
evaluated, which is expressed by μή. The addressee is invited to adopt this evaluative 
stance towards the object of conceptualization to infer that certain conclusions are 
invalid. 
The matrix verb adds information about the motive of the speaker: what is to be 
done with the stance. Is the speaker sharing his attitude in order to increase the 
common ground of speaker and addressee (e.g. fear), or is he merely requesting the 
addressee to prevent or to change the undesirable situation (e.g. ‘watch that’)? The 
matrix verb also expresses whose evaluative stance is contained in the complement 
clause and how severe consequences are when the addressee does not undertake 
action. These parts of information together inform the addressee about the 
commitment of the speaker towards the evaluative stance and thus give the invitation 
less or more strength. 
                                                             
23
 Willi (2003: 265): “extremely common in Aristophanes, who has c. 40 out of the 80 examples in 
classical Greek.” 
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3. Μή in the main clause: Prohibitive and optative clauses 
The main function of communication is to influence the cognition and (thereby) the 
behavior of others. A way of doing that is expressing our negative evaluative stance 
towards the behavior or plans for behavior of the other, and implicitly or explicitly 
requesting the other to change his behavior. Useful constructions for this function are 
the prohibitive (treated in this section) and the warning (conditional, treated in section 
5). The prohibitive, constructed as a main clause with μή and imperative, 2nd person 
aorist subjunctive or 2nd person future indicative (or without a verb), forms 
approximately a quarter of the whole corpus. The warning, a conditional clause with 
unless/if…not, can be more effective because it makes the consequences more explicit, 
and is (therefore?) used more frequently: one third of the corpus.  
 
The corpus contains 98 sentences in which μή is used in the main clause. All of them 
express a negative evaluative stance; most of these are a prohibitive (used as a request 
to the addressee), but some are better described as an instance of sharing (without a 
directive sense). 88 sentences contain verbs with different moods (see Table 5), 10 
sentences have no verb (section 3.2). Frequencies of the different moods are given in 
Table 5.  
The imperative is the most frequent mood in main clauses with μή and directly 
after that comes the subjunctive, of which a large majority has a 2nd person subject. 
These 2 constructions are used to express the prohibitive. Some subjunctive have a 1st 
person or 3rd person subject; these constructions express an adhortative. Only 3 
sentences have a verb in optative mood; this mood (without particle ἄν) is not suitable 
to express a prohibitive, as will be seen below. The indicative is used in only 6 
sentences, of which 5 contain the peculiar οὐ μή + 2nd person future indicative 
construction (treated in section 4). 
In this section I try to answer the question: what is the difference between these 
moods with μή or οὐ μή in the main clause? What have these constructions in 
common and what distinguishes them? I presuppose that moods give information 
similar to matrix verbs, about the motive of communication and speaker commitment. 
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Table 5. Moods, tenses and subjects with μή in main clauses. 
  1
st
 person 2
nd
 person 3
rd
 person impersonal Total 
imperative present  36 1  41 
 perfect  4    
subjunctive present 2 2 1  38 
 aorist 6
24
 22 4 1  
indicative present  1   6 
 future  4
25
    
 aorist 1     
optative aorist 1 1 1  3 
Total  10 70 7 1 88 
 
3.1 Expressing responsibility 
(12) σίγα, μὴ κάλει μου τοὔνομα (Ar. Av. 1506) 
be.silent.IMPER MH call.PRS.IMPER me the.name 
‘Sh! sh! Don't call me by my name’  
(13) μή, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἡμῶν κατείπῃς, ἀντιβολῶ σε, δέσποτα. (Ar. Pax 376) 
MH to the gods us report.AOR.SBJ beg.1SG you master.VOC 
‘I adjure you in the name of the gods, master, don't report us!’  
 
By using μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance 
towards an object of conceptualization and to invalidate certain conclusions (such as 
“this behavior is desirable”). With verbs with 2nd person subject (imperative, 
subjunctive, future indicative), this object of conceptualization partly overlaps with the 
communicative event: the addressee is part of the object of conceptualization and 
takes part in the event. That makes the prohibitive a remarkable construction. A 
prohibitive expresses the evaluative stance of the speaker towards some (ongoing or 
anticipated) action of the addressee. The addressee is asked to take over that stance 
and draw the conclusion to not continue or start the action. The addressee is expected 
to be able to control the undesirable behavior and is requested to take that 
responsibility. The peculiarity about prohibitions is that the addressee is thus explicitly 
invited to adopt a negative stance towards his own behavior or plans. The addressee is 
involved in two ways; this might be the reason for the sense of “impulse” and 
“expressive appeal for hearer involvement” in descriptions of the meaning of the 
imperative (Fortuin & Boogaart 2009: 652, 656). The responsibility for the addressee is 
made explicit.26 
                                                             
24
 3 οὐ μή constructions 
25
 All οὐ μή constructions. 
26
 It is important to note that there are more constructions in Greek to express an order/request or 
prohibitive, e.g. potential optative + ἄν (negation οὐ), ὅπως + subjunctive (cf. 2.4) (negative μή), 
infinitive (negative μή). 
An intersubjective approach to constructions with μή in Greek 63 
 
Not only the addressee is involved in a special way, also the speaker is highly 
committed in these directive speech acts, as Takahashi (1994) argues. This speaker 
commitment is not observable, but can be made explicit with markers like English 
please, do, for heaven’s sake. In the corpus, many of these markers are found with 2nd 
person verbs: ἀντιβολῶ σε, ἱκετεύω, λίσσομαί σε ‘I beg you’, μὰ Δία ‘by Zeus’, μὰ τὸν 
Ἡρακλέα ‘by Heracles’, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν ‘in the name of the gods’. They are used for 
positive and negative directions. 
 
Based on the description above, every 2nd person verb with μή invites to take a 
negative evaluative stance towards his own actions or plans. What is the difference in 
argumentative strength between 2nd person imperative mood, subjunctive mood, 
optative mood or even future indicative mood with μή?  
First of all, Greek is one of many languages that use two strategies to express 
prohibition. In positive orders, imperative verbs occur in present and aorist tense. For 
the prohibitive the imperative is used in present (and perfect), and the subjunctive in 
aorist. The difference between these two tenses/stems is defined by whether the 
undesired behavior of the addressee was already going on or not yet. With present 
imperative, the speaker expresses his aversion to the addressee’s ongoing behavior 
and asks him to stop it (example 12 above); with aorist subjunctive, the speaker 
presents the addressee planned behavior as undesirable and asks him to not start 
(example 13). 
However, there are two sentences (Ar. Nu. 614 and Ar. V. 976)27 with 2nd person 
subjunctive present. These two are interpreted as prohibitives as well, but with a more 
iterative meaning. In Ar. Nu. 614, the speaker said quite often to not buy a torch, since 
the moon is (often) beautiful. In Ar. V. 976, the speaker tries to convince the addressee 
to not kill the different dogs.  
Responsibility in subjunctive 
By using μή + 2nd person imperative or subjunctive, the speaker invites (urges) the 
addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards his own plans or behavior 
(about which he has control or responsibility), invalidate inconsistent conclusions and 
to take responsibility for the situation. The (expected) result is that the addressee 
changes his plans or behavior as requested into something that is more consistent with 
the stance. 
                                                             
27
 μὴ πρίῃ, παῖ, δᾷδ’, ἐπειδὴ φῶς Σεληναίης καλόν. (Ar. Nu. 614) 
MH buy.2SG.PRS.SBJ, boy, torch, because light moon.GEN beautiful 
“Boy, don't buy a torch, for the moonlight is beautiful.”  
ἴθ’, ἀντιβολῶ σ’, οἰκτίρατ’ αὐτόν, ὦ πάτερ, καὶ μὴ διαφθείρητε. (Ar. V. 976) 
PRT beg.1SG you have.pity.AOR.IMPER him PRT father and MH destroy.2PL.PRS.SBJ 
“Come on, please, be merciful to him, father, don’t destroy!”  
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With verbs in subjunctive mood and 3rd person subject, the speaker does not 
literally ask the addressee to consider his own behavior; see examples (14) and (15). 
However, the addressee is considered capable of preventing the situation with the 3rd 
person to take place. Subjunctives with 1st person subjects are interpreted as 
adhortative (example (15)); the 1st person plural is meant inclusively28 and the 
addressee is requested to join.  
 
(14) μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνῃ ποτὲ μηδέ περ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας (Ar. Ach. 221) 
MH PRT scoff.at.3SG.AOR.SBJ ever MH.and PRT old.ACC.PL being.PTC.ACC.PL 
escaped.PTC.SG.NOM acharnian.ACC.PL  
‘[Let us follow him,] let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having 
escaped’  
(15) Αἰγεΐδη, φράσσαι κυναλώπεκα, μή σε δολώσῃ  (Ar. Eq. 1067) 
son.of.Aegeus beware.AOR.IMPER foxdog.ACC MH you deceive.3SG.AOR.SBJ 
‘Oh, Aegeus’ son! Beware of the foxdog, don’t let him outfox you!’  
“It would be undesirable if he deceives you”  
(16) μή νυν ἀνῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπεντείνωμεν ἀνδρικώτερον. (Ar. Pax 515) 
MH now give.up.1PL.AOR.SBJ but get.stronger.1PL.AOR.SBJ manly.COMP 
‘Don't let us give up, let us redouble our efforts.’ 
 
No addressee’s responsibility in optative 
Imperative and subjunctive verbs with 1st, 2nd and 3rd person are used when the 
speaker considers an idea or behavior as undesirable, he expects the addressee to 
have the capability and requests him to take the responsibility to change it. This 
capability (and responsibility) to prevent something to take place or continue is what 
defines the difference between expressions in subjunctive and optative in this corpus. 
The optative is used when the speaker assumes (or expresses to assume) that the 
addressee cannot change an undesirable situation.29 The only example of a 2nd person 
optative with μή is given in (17)—it is a complicated example, but it does support the 
idea that the addressee is not expected to be capable of changing the undesirable. 
 
                                                             
28
 ‘Inclusive we’ means ‘you and I’, while ‘exclusive we’ means ‘I and somebody else, but not you’. In 
many languages, although not in Greek, these two we’s have different forms. To this traditional pair I 
would like to add a third we, meaning ‘you and maybe somebody else, but not me’, often used in 
hortatives from higher-placed people to lower-placed people, e.g. a manager to an employee or a 
teacher to a class. But that aside. 
29
 The expression of non-expectation is the reason that this construction is used for very polite 
requests or wishes. The addressee is not bound by the speaker, he would not lose face if he does not 
answer his request (in the sense of Brown & Levinson 1987). 
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(17) ἔρειδε, μὴ παύσαιο μηδέποτ’ ἐσθίων τέως ἕως σαυτὸν  
work.IMPER MH stop.2SG.AOR.OPT never eat.PTC so.much until yourself 
λάθῃς διαρραγείς. (Ar. Pax 31) 
be.unaware.2SG burst.PTC 
‘Come, pluck up courage, I hope you never stop eating until you suddenly 
burst!’  
“It is undesirable if you ever stop eating”  
 
In (17), the speaker (a slave) expresses the wish that the addressee (a dung beetle) eat 
towards its explosion, or literally, the aversion to the idea of the beetle stopping to eat. 
In different translations30 this sentence is interpreted as a directive/imperative clause, 
but there is a good reason that this verb is an optative and not a prohibitive. The 
speaker took the dung beetle as the subject, but actually expresses his wish towards 
the audience or the second slave (on stage). It is comparable to the situation after a 
conversation on the phone with a salesman, and when you have hung up the phone, 
you say something bad to that person (“I hope you choke on your special offer!”), with 
the intention that he does not hear it, but a third person in the room does. The 
subject/addressee is not expected to take responsibility. The “special offer” is ironic, as 
is the “never stop eating” in (17). The dung beetle eats feces, so the slaves are 
kneading cakes and cookies from feces; something they want to quit as soon as 
possible.  
Also in (18), the speaker (1st person subject) has no influence on the situation he 
describes—it is definitely not an adhortative as 1st person subjunctive would be. In 
(19), although interpreted by different translators as a directive (“please kill him”), the 
speaker expresses his aversion to ‘him’ (Fury) coming back, but he does not make his 
addressee, Dionysus, responsible for preventing the situation. 
 
(18) μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα μή νυν ἔτ’ ἐγὼ ’ν τοῖσι δικασταῖς κλέπτοντα Κλέωνα λάβοιμι. 
(Ar. V. 758) 
by the Heracles MH now still I in the judges stealing.ACC Cleon.ACC take.AOR.OPT 
‘I swear by the great Heracles, that I hope I’ll never be put on the jury that 
convicts Cleon of stealing!’
31
  
(19) ἀλλ’, ὦ Διόνυσ’, ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ ’λθοι φέρων. (Ar. Pax 267) 
PRT PRT Dionysos perish.3SG.AOR.OPT and MH come.3SG.AOR.OPT bringing 
‘Ah! Bacchus! I wish he dies and does not come bringing [the pestle]!’  
 
                                                             
30
 Eugene O'Neill, Jr., 1938 (Perseus); G. Theodoridis. 
31
 Translation of Theodoridis. O’Neill interprets the opposite: ‘By Heracles, may I reach the court in 
time to convict Cleon of theft.’ Either way, the subject has not influence on being in the court or jury. 
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In sum, by using an imperative or subjunctive mood in the main clause with μή, the 
speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the 
situation expressed by the verb, and to discard inconsistent ideas, and he requests the 
addressee to take (some) responsibility in changing or preventing the undesirable 
situation. By using an optative mood in the main clause with μή, the speaker invites the 
addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the situation expressed by 
the verb, and to discard inconsistent ideas, but he does not make the addressee 
responsible for changing or preventing the undesirable situation. This, the expression 
of non-expectation, is the reason that this construction is used for wishes or very polite 
requests (e.g. to gods). The addressee is not bound by the speaker, he would not lose 
face if he does not answer his request (in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987)) and 
neither does the speaker. 
3.2 Aversion without a verb 
10 main clauses with μή do not contain a verb. In example (20) speaker Philocleon 
expresses his wish to tell the baker’s wife an anecdote; he invites her to adopt a 
positive evaluative stance towards this idea. The baker’s wife (B) expresses her 
aversion; she invites him to adopt a negative evaluative stance for a while and requests 
him to drop any invalid conclusions, among which is ‘I should tell an anecdote’. 
 
(20) Ph.  ἄκουσον ὦ γύναι: λόγον σοι βούλομαι λέξαι χαρίεντα. (Ar. V. 1400) 
  hear.IMPER PRT woman story you want.1SG tell.INF fine  
B.  μὰ Δία μὴ 'μοί γ᾽ ὦ μέλε. 
  by Zeus MH me PRT PRT friend.VOC  
‘Listen, woman, I wish to tell you a lovely anecdote. —By Zeus, not for me’  
 
All 10 sentences are to be interpreted as a prohibitive: the addressee is requested to 
prevent the ‘situation’ and has full responsibility, according to the speaker. Apparently, 
this is the prototypical use of μή in the main clause—it does not need a verb to express 
the subject (2nd person) or the high degree of responsibility (imperative or subjunctive 
mood). This idea of a prototype fits well with the frequencies as shown in Table 5: 
imperative and 2nd person subjunctive together form approximately 70% of the 
sentences with μή in the main clause. 
3.3 Mή opens two mental spaces 
Above, in section 1.2 in this chapter, I described how logical negation opens two 
mental spaces, one with not-x and one with x. We are able to refer to both spaces in 
the discourse. That μή is more than a marker of undesirability is proven by the 
following examples (21-22). 
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(21) πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ τύπτ’· εἰ δὲ μή, σαυτόν ποτ’ αἰτιάσει. (Ar. Nu 1433) 
for that MH beat.2SG.IMPER; if PRT MH yourself ever blame.2SG.FUT 
‘Therefore do not beat me; otherwise you will one day blame yourself.’ 
(22) καὶ λάβεσθε τουτουὶ καὶ μὴ μεθῆσθε μηδενί· εἰ δὲ μή, ’ν πέδαις παχείαις  
and take.2PL.IMPER him and MH give.2PL.IMPER nobody; if PRT MH in chains thick  
οὐδὲν ἀριστήσετε. (Ar. V. 435) 
nothing eat.lunch.2PL.FUT 
‘Seize this man and hand him over to no one, otherwise you shall starve to 
death in chains.’ 
 
If μή only functioned as a marker of undesirability, to share the negative evaluative 
stance to some situation, the examples above would mean something different than 
the translation says. Above examples show that μή (at least in prohibitive 
constructions) is able to open two mental spaces. Consider example (21). With μή as 
an undesirability marker, the words μὴ τύπτε would mean something like ‘it is 
undesirable that you hit me’. The second part of the sentence would not make sense: 
‘if not, you will blame yourself’.32 This means that the negative evaluative stance has to 
be adopted by the addressee, at least: ‘if you do not take over my evaluative stance 
towards you beating me, you will blame yourself’. But in fact, the addressee will not 
blame himself for not adopting the stance, but for not not carrying out the action. Μή 
τύπτε opens two mental spaces, like negation: a undesirable space in which the 
addressee beats the speaker (x) and a desirable space in which the addressee does not 
beat the speaker (not-x). εἰ δὲ μή must refer to the not-x space: ‘if you not [not beat 
me]’. 
Not every construction with μή opens this not-x space. Complement constructions 
with verbs of fear, e.g. he is afraid I get lost, cannot be extended with if not, I/he will 
blame myself/himself. 
The constructions with μή that do open the not-x space (next to the x space) are 
at least the prohibitive constructions and the hortative constructions, among which are 
also the purpose complement clauses. These are also the constructions that give the 
addressee responsibility for the situation. These two characteristics, giving 
responsibility and opening space not-x seem connected.  
3.4 Indicative 
The moods that were mentioned above, imperative, subjunctive, and optative, are 
known for their use to express an evaluative stance: without μή, they express a positive 
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 Conditional clauses are treated in section 5. 
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evaluative stance towards a situation they describe (‘go on, start, let’s, hopefully…’). It 
is thus not strange that μή, as a marker of undesirability, is used in this kind of 
evaluative constructions. However, μή is also used in constructions with verbs in 
indicative mood, known as expressing an epistemic stance, albeit it only 6 times in this 
corpus. 
The indicative mood is in most cases part of a special construction, the οὐ μή + 2nd 
person future indicative construction, which is treated in section 4. Only 1 sentence is 
an example of μή + aorist indicative, which indicates a “passionate oath” about the 
past (Kühner & Gerth 1904: §510) (example 23). For this utterance about the past with 
a high degree of certainty, we would expect an assertion with indicative mood and 
negation οὐ—it is an epistemic stance towards a situation in the past. With μή the 
speaker adds “the feeling of dislike or disgust, with which he repels a thought” (ibid.). 
Mή behaves like epistemic negation in this construction (with the added sense 
undesirability) and therefore we may say that this construction opens a not-x space as 
well. To the epistemic stance expressed by the indicative, the speaker adds an 
evaluative stance with μή. The argumentative strength is increased by the combination 
of two stances. I elaborate on this combination of stances in section 4.  
 
(23) (A: Look! Between Earth and the gods is air, right? Well, look, if we from Athens 
have to go, say to the Oracle at Delphi, we have to ask permission from the 
Boetians, to let us pass through their country. It’ll be the same with you. If 
you’ve got your city up there, the gods would have to pay you for the aromas of 
the sacrifices the humans make, to reach them.) 
B: μὴ ’γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω 
MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever 
‘[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived’ Ar. Av. 195 
4. Οὐ μή in one clause: two stances?  
The οὐ μή construction is a peculiar construction. Both particles οὐ and μή invite the 
addressee to invalidate certain conclusions that are inconsistent with the epistemic 
stance (οὐ) and the evaluative stance (μή) of the speaker. Both particles are able to 
open the not-x space next to the x space, although this is not true for all constructions 
with μή. The construction expresses “an emphatic prohibition” or “a strong conviction 
on the part of the speaker that the state of affairs will not be realized”, dependent on 
the mood of the verb (Rijksbaron 2006: 59).33  
Οὐ is logical negation, it has the function of inviting the addressee to adopt a 
particular epistemic stance towards some idea, and to abandon another one that is 
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 See chapter 2, section 4 about the view of Rijksbaron (1991; 2006).  
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inconsistent with it, and the function of directing the addressee to infer that certain 
conclusions are invalid (Verhagen 2005). Μή on the other hand, invites the addressee 
to adopt an evaluative stance and drop certain conclusions on this ground. The speaker 
expresses that he is certain about some idea (i.e. epistemic stance) and that he 
considers that idea undesirable (i.e. evaluative stance). In theory, the addressee is 
directed to infer that certain conclusions are invalid, not based on one stance 
(epistemic or evaluative), but on two stances (epistemic and evaluative).  
In practice, speakers do not express two stances (modalities) in the same clause. 
Nuyts (2009) introduces the “one-commitment-per-clause” principle, after observing 
that combinations of epistemic, deontic and/or evidential modality rarely occur in 
Dutch. The few combinations that do occur on a regular basis are constructions with a 
‘idiomatic’ meaning, and not a compositional meaning based on the sum of the two 
modalities. For example, deontic moeten ‘must’ + epistemic misschien ‘maybe’: “this 
combination as a whole expresses a (weak) deontic meaning of the “directive” type, 
and this is not just a matter of adding up the meaning of the epistemic adverb (a small 
chance) and the deontic (or dynamic) auxiliary (an obligation or necessity).” (ibid. 149). 
Following Nuyts’ “one-commitment-per-clause” principle, the combination of οὐ 
and μή, the one with epistemic modality and the other with deontic modality, cannot 
possibly express both modalities. Rather, they form a construction with a single, non-
compositional meaning. Using the οὐ μή construction, the speaker invites the 
addressee to adopt a negative stance towards an object of conceptualization and to 
infer that certain conclusions are invalid. The verbal mood, indicative future or aorist 
subjunctive, informs the addressee about the type of stance and helps him figuring out 
what the motive of the speaker is. οὐ μή + 2nd person indicative future emphasizes a 
negative evaluative stance and is interpreted as an emphatic prohibition. The 
construction opens two mental spaces x and not-x (οὐ always does this, and some 
constructions with μή as well) and gives the addressee the responsibility to bring out 
not-x. οὐ μή + subjunctive emphasizes a negative epistemic stance and is interpreted 
as an emphatic denial about the future. The negative evaluative stance is not 
completely absent, as we will see below. The construction opens two mental spaces (x 
and not-x), but does not give the addressee any responsibility for realizing a situation. 
The corpus contains 12 sentences with the οὐ μή construction, 6 with the 
subjunctive and 6 with indicative forms.  
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Table 6. Verbal mood and person in οὐ μή constructions. 
 Indicative Subjunctive  
1
st
 person  4 4 
2
nd
 person 5 1 6 
3
rd
 person 1
34
 1
35
 2 
 6  6 12 
 
4.1 Oὐ μή + future indicative 
6 sentences with οὐ μή in the corpus are formed with a future indicative form, 
expressing an “emphatic prohibition”. An example is given in (24). 
 
(24) οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις, ἀλλ’ ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοὶ (Ar. Nu. 505) 
not MH chatter.2SG.FUT.IND but follow.2SG.FUT.IND me 
“Don’t chatter; you will follow me”  
 
Different than we would expect from an indicative verb, in the οὐ μή + future 
indicative construction an evaluative stance is expressed, more than an epistemic 
stance. This construction may be comparable to the μή + indicative construction 
(section 3.4). For that construction, Kühner & Gerth state that with μή the speaker 
adds “the feeling of dislike or disgust, with which he repels a thought”. With the 2nd 
person future indicative, it is a strong invitation to the addressee to adopt a negative 
evaluative stance towards his own behavior, and he is given full responsibility to 
change it. As argued above, also the mental space with not-x is opened.  
It is not strange that a 2nd person indicative future verb form is interpreted as an 
order. The English sentence You will not go out tonight is more a prohibition than a 
prediction. If a particle of undesirability is added, there is no doubt anymore about the 
intention of the speaker: get the addressee to adopt the evaluative stance and drop all 
inconsistent conclusions, i.e. do not go on with the undesirable behavior but change 
the actions. Οὐ with indicative invites the addressee to adopt a negative epistemic 
stance towards the object of conceptualization (‘it is not the case’), μή adds a negative 
evaluation to it: ‘it will not and it’d better not happen’. 
4.2 Oὐ μή + subjunctive 
The οὐ μή + subjunctive construction expresses an epistemic stance about the future 
to which the speaker firmly commits. See examples (25) and (26). 
 
                                                             
34
 Ar. Pax 1037 (see example (27)). Verb form differs in manuscripts, see 4.3. According to the 
grammars, 3
rd
 person aorist subjunctive would be more appropriate. 
35
 Ar. Pax 1226. Verb form differs in manuscripts, see 4.3. 
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(25) κοὐ μή ποτέ σου παρὰ τὰς κάννας οὐρήσω μηδ’ ἀποπάρδω. (Ar. V. 394) 
and.not MH ever your against the railings urinate.1SG.AOR.SBJ and.MH 
fart.1SG.AOR.SBJ 
‘[I swear] I will never make water, never, nor ever let a fart, against the railing of 
thy statue.’  
(26) εὖ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὅτι (…) 
good PRT know.1SG I wisely (…)  
οὐ μὴ ’πιλάθῃ ποτ’, ὢν ἐκείνου τοῦ πατρός (Ar. Pax 1304) 
not MH forget.2SG.AOR.SBJ ever being that.GEN the father.GEN 
‘For I well know for a certainty that (…) you will never forget [this song], being a 
son of a father like that.’  
 
The firm epistemic stance about the future is also expressed by εὖ οἶδ᾽ ἐγὼ σαφῶς ‘I 
know well [and] clearly’ in (26). The speaker invites the addressee with strength to 
adopt his epistemic stance towards an object of conceptualization. The addressee does 
not need to undertake action (so not a request), but the speaker considers the 
information valuable for the addressee. The speaker’s motive for communication is 
between sharing and informing, at least in (26). 
Because it is impossible to have epistemic certainty about the future, it is 
inevitable to (also) express the speaker’s evaluative stance towards the object. In every 
assertion about the future, some hope or fear is captured. The same is visible in the οὐ 
μή + subjunctive construction: the object of conceptualization contains something 
undesirable for the speaker. In example (25) the speaker makes a promise about the 
future that he will not do this undesirable thing: ‘have pity and save him, and I will 
never dishonor you.’ In example (26), the speaker really hopes that the singer will 
never forget the song (although it is not in the singer’s best interest). In Ar. V. 612,36 
the speaker will not and really does not want to ask other people to serve him than his 
wife, since they come καταρασάμενος καὶ τονθορύσας ‘cursing and grumbling’. In Ar. 
Ach. 662,37 the speaker is very certain about never hanging around the city ὢν (…) 
δειλὸς καὶ λακαταπύγων ‘being a coward and a letch-arse’. 
The construction οὐ μή + subjunctive seems to be similar to the Dutch 
expressions zeker weten dat niet ‘to know for sure that not’ and vast en zeker niet 
‘surely not’. These expressions are less certain than bare weten ‘know’, and are more 
linked to hope than to certainty. However, the use of the word zeker ‘sure’ adds a hint 
                                                             
36
 κοὐ μή με δεήσῃ εἰς σὲ βλέψαι καὶ τὸν ταμίαν, ὁπότ’ ἄριστον παραθήσει (Ar. V. 612) 
and.not MH me needs.AOR.SBJ to you see.INF and the steward when best.ADV serve.3SG 
‘and I have no need to turn towards you or the steward to know when it shall please him to serve my 
dinner’. (Transl. Perseus) 
37
 κοὐ μή ποθ’ ἁλῶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν (Ar. Ach. 662) 
and.not MH ever caught.AOR.SBJ around the city 
‘I won’t be caught hanging around the city’ (Transl. G. Theodoridis) 
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of epistemic stance, and a hint of promise. In the Greek οὐ μή + subjunctive 
construction, οὐ functions in a similar way: it adds certainty to the wish that is 
expressed by μή + subjunctive. Apparently this epistemic ‘certainty’ is so important, 
that the construction as a whole has an epistemic modality. However, the evaluative 
meaning of μή is still present to some extent, as is the mitigating value of epistemic 
misschien in the Dutch deontic construction misschien moeten (Nuyts 2009).  
This construction is a clear example of how negative epistemic stance (logical 
negation) and negative evaluative stance (undesirability) are closely connected (cf. 
section 1.2 of this chapter). Both negative expressions are used. Again, “the wish is 
father to the thought”; this is applicable to both constructions with οὐ μή and in both 
constructions it is actually expressed: the wish and the thought. 
4.3 Question: how important is verbal mood in this construction? 
In Table 6, it is shown that verbs in future indicative mood have a 2nd person subject 
most of the time (if not always; see example (27)). Subjunctive forms in this 
construction are seldom in 2nd person and most of the time in 1st or 3rd person. If the 
verbal mood coincides so often with the subject, then how important is the mood? 
Willi (2003: 258) observes that “[e]mphatic prohibitions with οὐ μή + future 
indicative (Ach. 166, Nub. 367, Ran. 202) are so common that the indicative 
occasionally spreads even into the domain of οὐ μή + subjunctive in emphatic denials 
(Pax 1037, Ran. 508-9).” The sentence in (27), Ar. Pax 1037, cannot be interpreted as a 
prohibitive and must be interpreted as a promise.38 It is impossible to give the 
addressee responsibility for the way other people (in the future) look at his own glory. 
 
(27) οὐχὶ μὴ παύσει ποτ’ ὢν ζηλωτὸς ἅπασιν. (Ar. Pax 1037) 
not MH stop.3SG.FUT.IND ever being enviable all.DAT 
“[your glory] will never stop being enviable to all” 
‘your glory will be ever envied’  
 
On top of these observations comes the fact that Aristophanes lived in a time when a 
change in pronunciation took place, in which the aorist subjunctive and the future 
indicative became phonologically identical (Petrounias 2007).39 Scribes in later 
centuries probably lacked native speaker’s intuition about the difference between 
these moods and may have made mistakes while copying these texts. Forms do indeed 
differ per edition. Examples are Ar. Pax 1037, which has the verb in future indicative 
                                                             
38
 Verb form of Ar. Pax 1037 differs in manuscripts. TLG gives παύσει, Perseus gives παύσῃ. 
39
 It takes too far to elaborate on this development, but it ended with two morphologically identical 
forms for indicative future and (aorist) subjunctive. See Christidis (ed.) (2007), part IV. 
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form in TLG,40 but in aorist subjunctive form in Perseus,41 and Ar. Pax 1226,42 for which 
the forms differ vice versa.  
Apparently, mood is not the most important part of the construction for the 
interpretation of the sentence. The addressee (and the reader) infers that the sentence 
is an invitation to adopt an evaluative stance and to conclude that (non-)action is 
requested from the person of the verb (probably 2nd) and the context. And the 
addressee infers that the sentence is an invitation to adopt an negative epistemic 
stance and to conclude that some inconsistent ideas are to be discarded when the verb 
has a 1st or 3rd person subject (the speaker promises and merely informs him about 
something he thinks is interesting and relevant for the addressee). 
4.4 Concluding: constructions with μή in main clauses 
We have seen different constructions with μή in main clauses: 2nd person present 
imperative, 2nd person aorist subjunctive, 1st and 3rd person subjunctive, optative 
clauses, main clauses with μή without a verb, οὐ μή with 2nd person future indicative 
and οὐ μή with subjunctive. Most of these constructions express a negative evaluative 
stance towards the object of conceptualization. Sometimes, in the constructions μή 
with indicative and οὐ μή with subjunctive, a negative epistemic stance is more 
present. Apart from the optative construction, all constructions open two mental 
spaces with not-x and with x. The constructions μή with imperative construction, μή 
with subjunctive, μή without a verb and οὐ μή with 2nd person future indicative 
express a request to the addressee to behave in such a way that not-x becomes or 
stays reality. 
5. Conditional clauses 
As argued above in section 3, the main function of communication is to influence the 
cognition and (thereby) the behavior of others. One way of doing that is expressing our 
negative evaluative stance towards the behavior or plans for behavior of the other, and 
implicitly requesting the other to change his behavior. Next to the prohibitive 
construction above, another useful construction for this function is the conditional 
construction. 
In traditional views, the meaning of conditional constructions is described in 
logical truth tables. Akatsuka (1997; 1999; Akatsuka & Strauss 2000) has disputed that 
                                                             
40
 N.G. Wilson, Aristophanis Fabulae. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 283-338. 
41
 Aristophanes, Aristophanes Comoediae, ed. F.W. Hall and W.M. Geldart, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1907. 
42
 οὗτος μὲν οὐ μή σοι ποιήσῃ ζημίαν. (Ar. Pax 1226) 
that PRT not MH you.DAT make.AOR.SBJ loss 
‘Oh, you will lose nothing over it.’ 
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by giving examples of conditionals in which F F = T (a False antecedent and a False 
consequent give True), but which express completely different attitudes from speakers 
and of which one can start a conversation and the other one must always be a 
repetition of what a previous speaker has just said.43 She suggests that “natural 
language conditionals are an important device for encoding the speaker’s evaluative 
stance of desirability” (Akatsuka 1999: 201). Conditionals in colloquial speech are best 
described as promises and threats (warnings): if something desirable happens, 
something desirable will happen, “desirable leads to desirable” or if something 
undesirable happens, something undesirable will happen “undesirable leads to 
undesirable”. Only 3% of the clauses combined a desirable part (antecedent or 
consequent) with an undesirable part. She bases her conclusions on conditionals 
uttered in Japanese.  
5.1 Desirability in Greek conditional clauses and the problematic role of μή 
The present Greek corpus contains 102 conditional clauses with εἰ μή ‘if not’. The 
consequence is negated with οὐ. For every sentence I have tried to decide whether the 
antecedent (the if-clause) and the consequence are desirable or undesirable, from the 
point of view of the speaker, while interpreting μή as ‘not’. The results match 
Akatsuka’s (1999), see Table 7. Only 3% has a combination of a desirable with an 
undesirable part. 
 
Table 7. Desirability in conditionals  
 Frequency 
If desirable > desirable (promise) 13 
If desirable > undesirable 0 
If undesirable > desirable 3 
If undesirable > undesirable (warning) 81 
(unclear) 5 
Total 102 
 
A problem arises at this point: in all 102 antecedents, with varying desirability, μή is 
used. This is not consistent with the idea of μή as an undesirability marker, a 
characteristic of every construction with μή so far.  
 
(28) ἀλλ’ οἶδ’ ἔγωγε τἄρρεν’, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι (Ar. Nu. 660) 
but know.1SG I the.males if MH be.mad.1SG.PRS 
‘I know the males, if I am not mad.’  
                                                             
43
 If I hadn’t given her the car keys, this accident wouldn’t have happened vs. If this sandwich was 
made this morning, you’re Shirley Temple. Akatsuka (1999: 200).  
The latter fits in the same category as described by Jespersen (1917: 26-27): e.g. devil take me if… 
(discussed in section 1.2 of this chapter).  
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(29) εἰ μή μ’ ἀναπείσετ’, ἀποθανεῖσθε τήμερον  (Ar. Eq. 68) 
if MH me obey.2PL die.2PL.FUT today 
“If you do not obey me, you will die today”  
 
In example (28), a conditional is given. This conditional can be interpreted as “desirable 
leads to desirable”: “I am not mad” (desirable) leads to “I know the males” (desirable). 
The idea μαίνομαι ‘I am mad’ is marked as undesirable, the addressee is invited to 
invalidate the idea of ‘being mad’, and then he comes to the right conclusion that the 
speaker ‘knows the males’. “It would be undesirable if I am mad, so discard that idea, 
invalidate the conclusion that I am mad and draw the conclusion consistent with my 
evaluative stance: ‘I am not mad’. If this is the case (and it is), I know the males.” 
The part of invalidating conclusions seems much more important than the part of 
marking something as undesirable. This is even more the case in conditionals that are 
interpreted as “undesirable leads to undesirable” (example 29).44 “You do not obey 
me” (undesirable) leads to “you will die today” (undesirable). The idea ἀναπείσετε ‘you 
obeying me’ is marked as undesirable with μή, although this is desirable for the 
speaker! “It would be undesirable that you obey, so discard that idea, invalidate the 
conclusion that you obey me and draw the conclusion consistent with the evaluative 
stance I just presented: ‘you do not obey me’. If this is the case, you will die today.” 
The literal interpretation of μή as an undesirability marker does not work in 
conditionals. In positive conditionals, promises, like (28), μή does mark undesirability; 
but in negative conditionals, threats, like (29), μή is part of the undesirability.  
Since there is no way around interpreting μή as ‘not’, we may conclude that μή in 
this construction comes very close to logical, epistemic negation.45 It opens two mental 
spaces, one with x and one with not-x, just as logical negation does and a pure 
undesirability marker does not. Μή as a word alone does not express a negative 
evaluative stance in this construction, only the construction as a whole does so. 
Since promises and threats are an important device to change the evaluative 
stance of the addressee towards an idea and thus his behavior, it is not surprising that 
μή is used in this construction. Promises and threats have in common with prohibitives 
that the speaker gives the addressee responsibility over changing or preventing a 
situation.  
                                                             
44
 From these examples, it might seem that the order of antecedent and consequent matter for the 
desirability/undesirability interpretation, but these are not correlated. Neither does it play a role if a 
negation is in the consequent (if not…, not). 
45
 This might be the reason that in Modern Greek conditional clauses, μή is replaced by δεν, which is 
the modern version of οὐ. 
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5.2 Moods in conditional clauses 
The speaker expresses how likely he considers it that the antecedent becomes or is 
reality by using different verbal moods (Rijksbaron 2006: 68 ff.), which seem to be 
correlated with the desirability of the conditional clause.  
The present indicative expresses no indication concerning the likelihood of 
fulfillment of the condition. The future indicative indicates that the speaker is skeptical 
about the fulfillment of the condition, and even considers it undesirable (ibid.): “It is 
clear that from the unpleasant consequences that the addressee had better take care 
lest the condition be fulfilled.” The indicative of the past expresses that the fulfillment 
of the condition is not or no more possible. The subjunctive expresses either that the 
speaker considers fulfillment of the condition very well possible (with a future 
reference in the consequence clause), or that the condition is repeatedly fulfilled, that 
it is a recurring (iterative) event (“every time you do this, I will punish you”). The 
optative expresses that the fulfillment of the condition is possible “and no more than 
that”. 
 
Table 8. Verbal mood in the antecedent of conditionals 
  desirable > 
desirable 
undesirable > 
desirable 
undesirable > 
undesirable 
no verb   1 14  
subjunctive present  1 15  33 (41%) 
 aorist 2 (15%)  18  
indicative present 6 (46%) 1 6 (7%) 27 (33%) 
 future 1   15 (19%)  
 perfect 1  1  
 aorist 1  3  
 imperfect 2  2  
optative present   2 6 
 aorist   4  
participle aorist   1 1 
  13 3 81  
 
These differences between moods are reflected in their use in desirable and 
undesirable conditionals, see Table 8. Most desirable conditionals (promises) contain a 
present indicative (6 sentences, 46% of all promises). Speakers do not make a 
judgment about the fulfillment of a desirable condition. Present indicative is not used 
so often in undesirable conditions (7%)—apparently, in these clauses speakers do like 
to express their attitude. 
The future indicative is used quite often in undesirable conditionals (19%), as 
described in Rijksbaron (2006: 68). The speaker expresses his expectation that his 
threat will not become reality, or maybe advises the addressee. This is opposed by the 
large number of subjunctives in undesirable conditionals (41%). The speaker considers 
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fulfillment of the condition very well possible, and I expect that the addressee really 
experiences these sentences as a threat. The sentence In the likely case you do 
something wrong, I will hurt you (subjunctive in Greek) is much scarier than Would you 
ever do something wrong, I will hurt you (future indicative in Greek). What further 
stands out is the optative that is only used in undesirable conditionals and not in 
desirable conditionals, and that the past indicative (aorist, imperfect) is relatively more 
frequent with desirable than with undesirable conditionals; but the number is so low, 
that I leave it at this remark. 
6. The three characteristics of constructions with μή  
In the previous sections, many different constructions with μή were discussed. It has 
become clear that it is impossible to point one semantic characteristic that is present in 
all constructions. But we have seen that some characteristics came back in different 
constructions. I want to argue that constructions with μή have three semantic 
characteristics in common:  
 
(I) The speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance 
towards some idea (x) (μή as an undesirability operator: the content of its 
clause is undesirable, according to the speaker).  
(II) The speaker invites the addressee to imagine a situation without x (not-x), and 
to infer that certain conclusions are invalid.  
(III) The speaker expresses that the addressee is capable or even has the 
responsibility to undertake action in order to prevent or change x.  
 
Not all constructions have all the three characteristics, but at least one characteristic is 
present in every one of the constructions. Μή is thus not seen as a word with one 
single meaning or function, but as a polysemous word that can be used in many 
constructions that are slightly different but also partly overlap. The constructions have 
some characteristics in common, but are not entirely the same. The three features 
together describe the function of μή in all the constructions treated in this chapter. 
 
- complement of fear (section 2) 
- wish complement (section 2) 
- deontic construction (section 2) 
- complement of negative order (section 2) 
- purpose clause (section 2) 
- prohibitive (section 3) 
- verbless main clause (section 3) 
- subjunctive (main clause) (section 3) 
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- optative (main clause) (section 3) 
- indicative main clause (section 3) 
- οὐ μή indicative (section 4) 
- οὐ μή subjunctive (section 4) 
- conditional (section 5) 
6.1 Three characteristics of constructions with μή 
I. Undesirability, negative evaluative stance, aversion 
One of the central problems of μή was its uses in complement clauses. It is used in 
complements of fear without negating this complement and in complements of 
negative orders (forbid) without becoming positive. Treating μή as a particle that 
expresses the negative evaluative stance of the speaker is a solution for these 
problems of μή. By using μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative 
evaluative stance towards an idea, the object of conceptualization. 
 
(30) δέδοικα μὴ διαφθαρῶ  
‘I am afraid I will get lost’ 
(31) ἀλλ’, ὦ Διόνυσ’, ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ ’λθοι φέρων. (Ar. Pax 267) 
PRT PRT Dionysos perish.3SG.AOR.OPT and MH come.3SG.AOR.OPT bringing 
‘Ah! Bacchus! I wish he dies and does not come bringing [the pestle]!’  
 
In example (30) (repetition of (4)), an expression of fear (section 2), the speaker thinks 
‘me getting lost’ is undesirable and by expressing that (“μή διαφθαρῶ”), he invites the 
addressee to adopt this negative evaluative stance and have the aversion to ‘me 
getting lost’. He does not necessarily ask the addressee to imagine ‘me not getting 
lost’, but asks only to consider all the undesirable parts of ‘me getting lost’. Μή is an 
undesirability marker. 
The same is true for μή + optative in main clauses (section 3), example (31) 
(repetition of (19)). The speaker considers ‘him coming back with a pestle’ undesirable, 
invites the addressee to think this too and to imagine how bad it would be if ‘he comes 
back with a pestle’. The addressee is not asked explicitly to imagine the opposite or to 
undertake action to bring about the opposite. 
II. Imagine the (desirable) world: not x 
In some constructions, after considering the undesirability of a situation, the addressee 
is asked, to imagine the world without that situation (x). This is a good preparation for 
an action plan if the addressee is given responsibility for preventing or changing a 
situation, but it need not necessarily be a preparation. Constructions for which the 
latter is true are μή + indicative in main clauses (example (32)) (section 3) and the οὐ 
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μή + subjunctive construction (33) (section 4). For these constructions it is well possible 
that the negative evaluative stance plays a minor role, and thus the most important 
aspect is to imagine the world without x. The addressee is not expected to make the 
world without x reality. 
 
(32) μὴ ’γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω (Ar. Av. 195) 
MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever 
‘[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived’  
(33) οὐ μὴ ’πιλάθῃ ποτ’, ὢν ἐκείνου τοῦ πατρός (Ar. Pax 1304) 
not MH forget.2SG.AOR.SBJ ever being that.GEN the father.GEN 
‘For I well know for a certainty that (…) you will never forget [this song], being a 
son of a father like that.’  
III. Capability or responsibility of the addressee for the desirable world 
The speaker may express that he regards the addressee to be capable to change or 
prevent the undesirable situation; he gives the addressee some responsibility to act. 
How much responsibility, or how severe consequences are if the addressee does not 
take (enough) responsibility (does not act), is expressed in different manners: by the 
matrix verb (μή in complement clause), by the verbal mood (μή in main clause), or by 
the consequence in a conditional construction. In section 2, 3 and 5, several 
constructions were described by which the speaker adds information about the 
addressee’s responsibility:  
 
- purpose clause (section 2) 
- prohibitive (section 3) 
- subjunctive (main clause) (section 3) 
- verbless main clause (section 3) 
- οὐ μή + indicative (section 4) 
- promises and warnings in conditionals (section 5) 
 
Without imagining the result of his actions (the desirable world without x), the 
addressee cannot plan his action. Therefore, feature II is part of the meaning of these 
constructions. In conditionals however, μή does not seem to function as an 
undesirability marker (feature I). Feature I is thus not part of every construction, just 
like feature III is not part of every construction with feature I and feature II.  
6.2 Overview of constructions and their characteristics 
An overview of the characteristics of all the described constructions with μή is given in 
Table 9. For every construction, it is indicated whether a pragmatic feature is present 
or not (or a little bit or only sometimes). I imagine the presence or absence of these 
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three features as a continuous scale. The table below may give the undesirable 
impression that the presence/absence of the features is a discreet or even binary scale. 
A better illustration is given in Figure 5.  
The group of constructions shown below forms a continuum as well. From 
construction in the upper part of Table 9 that express only or mostly evaluative stance, 
via the group in the middle that express all three features, to the conditional clauses 
that express only features II and III. I have tried to illustrate this continuum in Figure 5.  
 
Table 9. An overview of the features of all the described constructions with μή. ++ feature is 
present. + feature may be present. — feature is not present. ? not sure if feature is present. 
 I. evaluative stance II. imagine world 
with not-x 
III. addressee’s capability 
/responsibility 
fear ++ — — 
wish complement ++ + ? (depends on verb) 
deontic constr. ++ ? (depends on 
verb) 
? (depends on verb) 
optative mc ++ + — 
negative order ++ ++ ++ 
purpose clause ++ ++ + 
prohibitive ++ ++ ++ 
verbless mc ++ ++ ++ 
subjunctive mc ++ ++ +(+) 
οὐ μή indicative  ?/+ ++ ++ 
οὐ μή subjunctive  + ++ — 
indicative mc ? (little evidence) ++ — 
conditional — ++ ++ 
 
The question marks and the single + for a feature in the table are displayed in the 
figure as close by this feature. The 1st/3rd person subjunctive with μή in the main clause 
give the addressee some responsibility, but not with the same force as the 2nd person. 
The complement constructions: wish and deontic constructions are sometimes seen as 
requests, but sometimes they might be just an instance of sharing. It depends on the 
person (subject) and meaning of the matrix verb. 
 
An intersubjective approach to constructions with μή in Greek 81 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. The continuum of constructions with μή with three characteristics. 
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6.3 Prototype theory 
This way of looking at meanings of words comes close to the prototype theory of 
Geeraerts (1997). It is based on the idea of family resemblances from Wittgenstein 
(1953), and Geeraerts (1997:12) quotes Rosch & Mervis (1975: 574-5) to describe this:  
 
“Wittgenstein (1953) argued that the referents of a word need not have common 
elements to be understood and used in the normal functioning of language. He 
suggested that, rather, a family resemblance might be what linked the various 
referents of a word. A family resemblance relationship takes the form AB, BC, CD, 
DE. That is, each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common 
with one or more items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items.”  
 
Family members that have all or many characteristics are seen as the most prototypical 
members of the family and can be visualized in the centre of a category. Members that 
have only one or few characteristic(s) are less prototypical and are visualized in the 
periphery. Not all characteristics have the same weight; it is less or more important to 
have a characteristic in order to count as a prototypical member of the family or not. 
Family members that have the same set of characteristics may be visualized as a 
cluster.  
 
In Figure 5 is shown that the meanings of μή exhibit a family resemblance structure. 
Most constructions with μή have more than one characteristic, and we clearly see 
clustering of similar constructions in the scheme. 
Degrees of typicality are difficult to measure. It would be interesting to do a 
survey under students of Greek in high school and university with the question: 
mention a construction with μή. The construction that is mentioned most often would 
be the most typical. For now, we can take a look at the frequencies of every 
construction. Do the frequencies match Figure 5? The most central constructions, with 
most overlap, would be the most typical. Frequencies and percentages per cluster of 
constructions are given in Table 10. Clusters of constructions share characteristics. The 
percentages are shown in Figure 6, a repetition of Figure 5 with added percentages. 
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Table 10. Frequencies and percentages per cluster of 
constructions with μή. 
   
 Frequency Percent Total 
percent 
imperative (I, II, III) 41 16,4 38,4 
2nd subjunctive 23 9,2  
purpose complement 17 6,8  
no verb main clause 10 4,0  
οὐ μή + indicative 5 2,0  
conditional (II, III) 102 40,8 40,8 
wish complement (I, III) 13 5,2 10,8 
deontic construction 8 3,2  
negative order 6 2,4  
μή 1st/3rd subjunctive (I, II) 9 3,6 3,6 
οὐ μή + subjunctive (II, I) 6 2,4 3,2 
μή + indicative 1 ,4  
dynamic complement 1 ,4  
fear complement (I) 5 2,0 3,2 
optative main clause 3 1,2  
Total
46
 250 100,0  
 
In Figure 6 it is visible that the gravity is in the centre. The most frequent are the 
constructions that have all three characteristics: (I) expressing a negative evaluative 
stance, (II) inviting to imagine the desirable world (not-x) and (III) the addressee is 
given responsibility to realize not-x. This cluster contains requests.  
The conditional construction has the same frequency, although it does not have 
all three characteristics but only two. A reason for this might be that although μή does 
not function as a marker for undesirability, the construction as a whole does express 
(un)desirability. So maybe, on second thought, we might move conditionals more 
towards the centre as well. An extra reason for this move would be that promises and 
warnings may be seen as indirect requests (if you don’t do x, bad things happen ‘please 
do x’).  
The other constructions are found in the periphery of the figure, which 
corresponds with the frequencies of these clusters. These constructions are less typical 
because they only have one or two of the three characteristics. 
 
                                                             
46
 Of the 312 sentences, 62 were not discussed. These sentences contain noun phrases and satellite 
clauses, topics which I save for another moment. 
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Figure 6. The continuum with clusters of constructions with μή with three 
characteristics, with frequencies. 
 5  |  Conclusion 
1. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to propose an account for the different uses of the Greek 
particle μή with an intersubjective approach (Verhagen 2005). The particle is 
traditionally called “subjective negation”, as opposed to “objective negation” οὐ 
(Kühner & Gerth 1904), because of its use in prohibitives, wishes and conditional 
clauses. However, that raises a problem for its use in complements of matrix verbs of 
fear and verbs with a negative meaning such as ‘forbid’. The particle μή is also used in 
combination with οὐ. 
My analysis of constructions with μή is based on a corpus composed of all 
sentences with μή in six comedies of Aristophanes. I have looked at complement 
constructions, prohibitive constructions and other main clauses with μή, main clauses 
with οὐ μή, and conditional clauses. The original hypothesis was that the speaker uses 
μή to express his negative evaluative stance (as opposed to an epistemic stance) 
towards a situation: μή as an undesirability particle. This idea is based on Kvičala (cited 
in Kühner & Gerth), who proposes that μή is a repelling particle.  
The intersubjective approach proposes that complement constructions, the 
speaker invites the addressee to entertain the object of conceptualization (expressed 
in the complement) in a certain way. This ‘certain way’ is expressed by μή: the speaker 
presents the idea in the complement as undesirable. The matrix clause gives 
information about the commitment of the speaker and about the motive for 
communication of the speaker (Tomasello 2008): is he sharing his fears or wishes, or is 
he requesting the addressee to act upon it, in order to change or prevent the 
undesirable situation? 
This function of telling the addressee about the motive of the speaker turns out to 
define the difference between imperative and subjunctive mood in prohibitive 
constructions on the one hand, and optative main clauses on the other. The prohibitive 
constructions have a requesting function, i.e. they give the addressee responsibility to 
change or prevent a situation which is presented as undesirable by μή, whether the 
verb is in 2nd, 1st or 3rd person. Optative clauses have a sharing function, i.e. the 
speaker shares his evaluative stance towards an idea, but he does not expect the 
addressee to be capable (or at least responsible) to change or prevent a situation, even 
when the verb is in 2nd person. 
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A difference between constructions used for sharing a negative evaluative stance 
and constructions used for requesting action by the addressee is that the former only 
open a mental space with x (being negatively evaluated), whereas the latter also open 
a mental space with not-x (mental spaces: Verhagen (2005) and Fauconnier (1994)). To 
this not-x space, the desirable world, can be referred with a warning: “And if you do 
not [do not-x]…”. This possibility of opening a space with not-x is also a feature of 
logical negation. That both words can have this function shows how close repulsion 
(negative evaluative stance) and negation (negative epistemic stance) are connected 
and even intertwined sometimes. 
This close connection is also visible in the combination of οὐ μή in main clauses.  
The idea of μή as an undesirability marker makes it possible to explain the combination 
and its interpretation. In requests with 2nd person future indicative, μή adds a negative 
evaluative stance to the negative epistemic stance expressed by οὐ with indicative. In 
clauses with subjunctive, with which μή is the usual negative element, οὐ adds 
‘epistemic certainty’, expressing that the undesirable situation ‘surely’ will not happen.  
In conditional clauses, μή cannot be interpreted as an undesirability marker, but 
must be logical negation. Although the conditional construction as a whole often 
functions as a promise or a warning and is thus an expression of an evaluative stance, 
single μή is not. The original hypothesis is untenable for this construction. However, 
the construction εἰ μή has in common with prohibitive constructions that it often gives 
responsibility to the addressee (promising or warning if he does something good or 
bad) and that it opens a mental space with not-x. 
This brings us to the conclusion that all these constructions together show family 
resemblances in the sense of Wittgenstein (cited in Geeraerts 1997). They have three 
characteristics in common:  
 
(I) The speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance 
towards some idea (x) (μή as an undesirability operator: the content of its 
clause is undesirable).  
(II) The speaker invites the addressee to imagine a situation without x (not-x), and 
to infer that certain conclusions are invalid.  
(III) The speaker expresses that the addressee is capable or even has the 
responsibility to undertake action in order to prevent or change x.  
 
Some constructions have all these characteristics (e.g. prohibitives), some have only 
one (e.g. main clauses with optative) or two (e.g. conditional clauses). This is visualized 
in a Venn diagram such as Figure 6 on page 86. Constructions that have all three 
characteristics are the most prototypical and are in the centre of the category 
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(Geeraerts 1997). They are also the most frequent in the corpus. Constructions with 
only one or two of the characteristics are more peripheral and show lower frequencies.  
This thesis shows that the prototypicality theory is not only applicable for nouns 
and adjectives, but can be useful to account for different uses of one particle as well 
(μή in e.g. complement clauses of fear and in conditional clauses), that originally 
seemed to be incompatible, but eventually show family resemblances. The 
characteristics that the different constructions with μή share were found with an 
intersubjective approach. 
2. Further research 
Although the topic of this thesis can be summarized with one word, μή, this thesis 
touched multiple areas in linguistics: semantics, pragmatics, negation, general theories 
about language and communication, detailed examination of Greek. It has been 
impossible to cover all the details. Some of these holes and new questions or 
suggestions for future research are mentioned in this section. 
My corpus contained only sentences with μή from Aristophanes. It would be 
useful to examine composite forms of μή as well. Constructions that I have not 
discussed in this thesis are satellite clauses, noun phrases, and complements of 
dynamic verbs. I am curious about their position in the Venn diagram. Some 
constructions, e.g. the different complement constructions, I have only discussed very 
briefly. I have not looked into the role of the tense of the matrix clause of wish verbs, 
for example. Purpose clauses, whether complements or satellites, deserve more 
attention. Probably the diagram has to be adjusted when looking at these extra 
constructions or details of constructions. This is also possible if the same investigation 
is done with other writers and text types. 
In this thesis I have described a semasiological approach to μή. I have found three 
characteristics, but I did not investigate the prototypicality of these characteristics. Not 
all characteristics are equally important, according to Geeraerts. Next to this 
semasiological approach, it would be interesting to take a onomasiological approach to 
the concept of undesirability and requesting, since οὐ is used in constructions 
expressing these concepts as well. It might tell us more about the complicated 
relationship between negative evaluative and epistemic stance. 
Polysemy is associated with diachronic language change: it is a reflection of the 
development of a word. It would be interesting to see how the polysemy of μή has 
evolved, how this family of constructions with common characteristics has evolved. 
The use of μή has changed after the classical period. How did it evolve in the two 
millennia after Aristophanes? 
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This thesis has also shown that we have a world to win in research in non-
standard negation. The majority of the languages in the world uses more than one 
strategie to express negativity (epistemic stance and evaluative stance). Do they follow 
the same division of labor? Are the non-standard negators used in the same 
constructions? Do they share characteristics with μή? 
As said above, I look forward to the next decennium. 
 
 Appendix  |  Corpus from Aristophanes 
In the table below, all the sources of the constructions with μή are given. They are sorted 
by type of clause (main clause with μή, main clause with οὐ μή, complement clauses, 
conditional clauses, other) and subsequent by source or by other relevant information.  
In the first two columns, the source is given (works from Aristophanes; abbreviations given 
on p. 7). In the fifth column, additional information is given. In the most right column, the 
number of the corresponding section of Chapter 4 is given. 
work line clause verb comment section  
ch. 4 
Ach. 345 main clause no verb  3.2 
Eq. 833 main clause no verb  3.2 
Eq. 960 main clause no verb  3.2 
Nu. 84 main clause no verb  3.2 
Nu. 696 main clause no verb  3.2 
Nu. 850 main clause no verb  3.2 
V. 1179 main clause no verb  3.2 
V. 1400bis main clause no verb  3.2 
Pax 326 main clause no verb  3.2 
Av. 585 main clause no verb  3.2 
Ach. 334 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Ach. 496 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Ach. 655 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Ach. 1054 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Eq. 19 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj   3.1 
Eq. 193 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Eq. 230 main clause 2
nd
 perf imper  3.1 
Eq. 241 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Eq. 580 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Eq. 1051 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Eq. 1356 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Eq. 821bis main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Eq. 841 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Eq. 860 main clause 2
nd
 perf imper  3.1 
Nu. 1138 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Nu. 1267 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Nu. 1433 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Nu. 189 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Nu. 614 main clause 2
nd
 prs sbj  3.1 
Nu. 716 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Nu. 761 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 25bis main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 37ter main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 228 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 336 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 371 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 415 main clause 2
nd
 perf imper  3.1 
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V. 434 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 652bis main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 751 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 919 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 922 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 976 main clause 2
nd
 prs sbj   3.1 
V. 998 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 1135 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
V. 1418bis main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 1435 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 59 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 146 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Pax 151 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 337 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 376bis main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Pax 382 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Pax 384a main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 389 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 648bis main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 83 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 87 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 979 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 1061ter main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 165 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 206 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 597 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 959 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Av. 961 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1195 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Av. 1238 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1364 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1420 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Av. 1436 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1504bis main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1506 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Av. 1534 main clause 2
nd
 prs imper  3.1 
Nu. 267 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj  3.1 
V. 162 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj  3.1 
Pax 515 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj  3.1 
Pax 1051 main clause 1
st
 prs sbj  3.1 
Av. 353 main clause 1
st
 prs sbj  3.1 
Av. 195 main clause 1
st
 aor ind  3.3 
Ach. 221 main clause 3
rd
 aor sbj   3.1 
Eq. 1067 main clause 3
rd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Eq. 1081 main clause 3
rd
 aor sbj  3.1 
Nu. 560 main clause 3
rd
 prs imper  3.1 
Pax 801 main clause 3
rd
 prs sbj  3.1 
Pax 267 main clause 3
rd
 aor opt   3.1 
V. 758 main clause 1
st
 aor opt  3.1 
Pax 31 main clause 2
nd
 aor opt  3.1 
Ach. 166 main clause 2
nd
 prs ind οὐ μή 4.3 
Ach. 662 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj  οὐ μή 4.1 
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V. 394 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj οὐ μή  4.1 
V. 612 main clause impers aor sbj οὐ μή 4.1 
Pax 1226 main clause 3
rd
 aor sbj οὐ μή  4,1 
Pax 1304 main clause 2
nd
 aor sbj οὐ μή  4.1 
Av. 461 main clause 1
st
 aor sbj οὐ μή 4.1 
Nu. 296 main clause 2
nd
 fut ind οὐ μή  4.2 
Nu. 367 main clause 2
nd
 fut ind οὐ μή  4.2 
Nu. 505 main clause 2
nd
 fut ind οὐ μή 4.2 
V. 397bis main clause 2
nd
 fut ind οὐ μή  4.2 
Eq. 112 finite complement 1st person fear 2 
Nu. 493 finite complement 1st person fear 2 
V. 109 finite complement 3rd person fear 2 
V. 1358 finite complement 3rd person fear 2 
Pax 606 finite complement 3rd person fear 2 
Ach. 169 non-finite complement 1st person negative verb 2 
Ach. 320 non-finite complement 1st person negative verb 2 
Ach. 634 non-finite complement 3rd person negative verb 2 
Eq. 572 non-finite complement 3rd person negative verb 2 
Eq. 1072 non-finite complement 3rd person negative verb 2 
Av. 557 non-finite complement 2nd person negative verb 2 
Ach. 625 non-finite complement 1st person wish, order 2 
Ach. 1108 non-finite complement 2nd person wish, order 2 
Ach. 1113 non-finite complement 2nd person wish, order 2 
Eq. 1273 non-finite complement 3rd person wish, order 2 
Nu. 433 non-finite complement 1st person wish, order 2 
V. 1047 non-finite complement 3rd person wish, order 2 
V. 1121 non-finite complement 1st person wish, order 2 
V. 116 non-finite complement 3rd person wish, order 2 
V. 414 non-finite complement 3rd person wish, order 2 
V. 720 non-finite complement 1st person wish, order 2 
Pax 1306 non-finite complement impersonal wish, order 2 
Pax 438 non-finite complement 1st person wish, order 2 
Av. 1026 non-finite complement 2nd person wish, order 2 
Av. 29 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Ach. 1079 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Eq. 13 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Eq. 536 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Eq. 876 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Nu. 1414 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Nu. 931 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Pax 96 non-finite complement impersonal deontic 2 
Nu. 976 non-finite complement 3rd person purpose 2.4 
V. 446 non-finite complement 3rd person purpose 2.4 
Pax 672 non-finite complement 3rd person purpose 2.4 
Ach. 258 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
Eq. 253 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
V. 1013 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
V. 1386 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
V. 141 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
V. 155 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
V. 247 finite complement 1st person purpose 2.4 
V. 372 finite complement 1st person purpose 2.4 
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Pax 1099 finite complement 2nd person purpose 2.4 
Ach. 343 finite complement no matrix purpose 2.4 
Nu. 257 finite complement no matrix purpose 2.4 
Nu. 824 finite complement no matrix purpose 2.4 
Av. 1239 finite complement no matrix purpose 2.4 
Av. 1494 finite complement no matrix purpose 2.4 
Nu. 994 non-finite complement 2nd person dynamic  
Eq. 201 conditional clause aor sbj des > des 5 
Eq. 210 conditional clause aor sbj des > des 5 
Nu. 1347 conditional clause perf ind des > des 5 
Nu. 327 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
Nu. 415 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
Nu. 645 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
Nu. 660 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
Nu. 1035 conditional clause fut ind des > des 5 
V. 180 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
V. 345 conditional clause impf ind des > des 5 
Pax 10 conditional clause prs ind des > des 5 
Pax 1070 conditional clause impf ind des > des 5 
Pax 1151 conditional clause aor ind des > des 5 
Ach. 619 conditional clause prs sbj undes > des 5 
Eq. 1158bis conditional clause no verb undes > des 5 
Nu. 295 conditional clause prs ind undes > des 5 
Ach. 60 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Ach. 137 conditional clause impf ind undes > undes 5 
Ach. 138 conditional clause aor ind undes > undes 5 
Ach. 317 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Ach. 684 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Ach. 773 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Ach. 828 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 68 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 69 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Eq. 186 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Eq. 315 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 337 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 400 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 575 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 615 conditional clause aor ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 694 conditional clause aor opt undes > undes 5 
Eq. 698 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 700 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 700 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 767 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 769 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 770 conditional clause perf ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 1019 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Eq. 1176 conditional clause impf ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 1360 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 949 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 981 conditional clause aor ind undes > undes 5 
Eq. 996 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Nu. 1183bis conditional clause aor opt undes > undes 5 
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Nu. 1194 conditional clause prs opt undes > undes 5 
Nu. 1433 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Nu. 1435bis conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Nu. 1439 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Nu. 1500 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Nu. 229 conditional clause aor ptc undes > undes 5 
Nu. 801 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Nu. 885 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 1328/9 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
V. 1351 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 1444 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 190 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
V. 303 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 402 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 428 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 435 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 437 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
V. 524 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 558 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 568 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 594 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 614 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 650 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 653 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
V. 73 conditional clause aor opt undes > undes 5 
V. 90 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 916 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
V. 930 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
V. 972 conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Pax 102 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Pax 107 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Pax 1072 conditional clause aor opt undes > undes 5 
Pax 1292 conditional clause prs opt undes > undes 5 
Pax 1310 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Pax 176 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Pax 189 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Pax 262 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Pax 27 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Pax 318 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Pax 381 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Pax 384b conditional clause no verb undes > undes 5 
Pax 450 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 1086 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 1114 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 1523 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
Av. 1534 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 1681 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Av. 191 conditional clause prs sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 439 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 549 conditional clause prs ind undes > undes 5 
Av. 555 conditional clause aor sbj undes > undes 5 
Av. 932 conditional clause fut ind undes > undes 5 
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Eq. 1106 conditional clause prs imper 0 5 
V. 616 conditional clause prs sbj 0 5 
V. 493 conditional clause prs sbj 0 5 
V. 965 conditional clause aor ind 0 5 
Pax 828,bis conditional clause no verb 0 5 
Ach. 441 noun phrase    
Ach. 722 noun phrase    
Ach. 900 noun phrase    
Ach. 903 noun phrase    
Eq. 265 noun phrase    
Eq. 803 noun phrase    
Eq. 1138 noun phrase    
Eq. 1288 noun phrase    
Nu. 1084 noun phrase    
V. 1045 noun phrase    
V. 1048 noun phrase    
V. 1121 noun phrase    
V. 264 noun phrase    
V. 535 noun phrase    
V. 656 noun phrase    
V. 762bis noun phrase    
Av. 37 noun phrase    
Ach. 112 purpose satellite    
Ach. 928 purpose satellite     
Ach. 930 purpose satellite     
Ach. 1052 purpose satellite     
Eq. 14 purpose satellite    
Eq. 785 purpose satellite     
Eq. 1029 purpose satellite     
Eq. 1393 purpose satellite     
Eq. 851 purpose satellite     
Eq. 880 purpose satellite     
Nu. 195 purpose satellite     
Nu. 996 purpose satellite     
V. 1028 purpose satellite     
V. 1091 purpose satellite     
V. 113 purpose satellite     
V. 377 purpose satellite     
V. 531 purpose satellite     
V. 70 purpose satellite     
V. 929 purpose satellite     
V. 961 purpose satellite     
Pax 1037 purpose satellite     
Pax 1234 purpose satellite     
Pax 208 purpose satellite     
Pax 226 purpose satellite     
Pax 30 purpose satellite     
Pax 309 purpose satellite     
Pax 333 purpose satellite     
Pax 926 purpose satellite     
Pax 928 purpose satellite     
Av. 1427 purpose satellite     
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Av. 1509 purpose satellite     
Av. 560 purpose satellite     
Av. 712 purpose satellite     
Ach. 466 other satellite     
Eq. 749 other satellite     
Nu. 1243 other satellite     
Nu. 619 other satellite     
Nu. 777 other satellite     
Nu. 792 other satellite     
Nu. 966 other satellite     
V. 648 other satellite     
Pax 21 other satellite     
Pax 314 other satellite     
Pax 315 other satellite     
Av. 1115 other satellite     
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